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I. INTRODUCTION 
The American farm economy is in its worst financial condition 
since the 1930s. Plummeting land values, low crop prices, and high 
interest rates have put farmers and agricultural creditors in a financial 
squeeze. As farm incomes have declined, and as the security position 
of farm lenders has deteriorated, farm foreclosures and bankruptcies 
have increased to levels not seen since the Great Depression. Farmers 
have tried, largely in vain, to reorganize under chapter 11 of the fed- 
eral Bankruptcy Code. This led to the enactment of a new family 
farmer bankruptcy option, chapter 12 bankruptcy reorganization, in 
1986. Many farmers facing financial difficulty have now been given 
the option of having a farm reorganization plan confirmed under chap- 
ter 12. Whether this will lead to the ultimate survival of the reorga- 
nized family farm enterprise remains to be seen. 
* B.A. Hastings College, 1972; J.D. George Washington University, 1975; Associate 
Professor of Agricultural Economics (Water &Agricultural Law Specialist), Uni- 
versity of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
t Research support for preparation of this article was provided by the Nebraska 
Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
19871 FAMILY FARMER BANKRUPTCY 633 
Although farm real estate values appear to be stabilizing,l the cur- 
rent financial difficulties facing farmers are not likely to abate soon. 
Federal farm program payments have become highly controversial, 
and are scheduled for annual reductions to the year 1990.2 These re- 
ductions in farm program payments will be reflected in reduced farm 
income for cash grain farmers. Long-term predictions indicate that 
the promise of dramatically increased agricultural productivity 
through biotechnology may exacerbate the current overproduction 
problem of farm commodities.3 If current estimates on the impact of 
biotechnology on farming are anywhere close to being accurate, the 
resulting financial upheaval will make the current financial difficul- 
ties seem mild, Thus farm bankruptcies are, and probably will con- 
tinue to be a significant part of the rural landscape. Any rural 
practitioner, whether he or she engages in bankruptcy practice or not, 
must become conversant with the fundamentals of farm bankruptcies. 
This article surveys the bankruptcy options available to farmers, 
including the legal developments leading to enactment of chapter 12. 
Part I1 discusses the farm economy, describing the land boom of the 
1. B. JOHNSON & R. HANSON, DEP'T OF AGRIC. ECONOMICS, Urn. OF NEBRASKA, 
REPT. NO. 151, NEBRASKA FARM REAL ESTATE MAFKET DEVELOPMENTS (1987) 
(hereinafter REAL ESTATE DEVELOPB~NTS) 
2. See Comment, Grarnm-Rudman-HolZings and the Farm Bill: Solution or Suicide 
Put?, 31 S.D.L.Rev. 541,545 (1986). Under the original Gramm-Rudman debt re- 
duction statute agricultural programs would have been required to take a 17.7% 
budget reduction to meet a 4.3% federal deficit reduction goal. Even though pro- 
visions of the original Gramm-Rudrnan federal debt reduction statute are likely 
to be modified, agricultural programs still will probably be disproportionately re- 
duced to help balance the budget, due primarily to agriculture's waning political 
clout. 
3. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, REPT. NO. OTA-F-285, 
TECHNOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN AG- 
RICULTURE (1986) (hereinafter TECHNOLOGY, POLICY AND STRUCTURE). OTA esti- 
mates that the total number of farms will fall 44% from 1982 to 2000. The number 
of small farms (up to $99,000 in annual gross sales) will fall 48%, the number of 
moderate sized farms ($100,000 to $199,000 in annual gross sales) will fall 58%, 
while the number of large farms (at least $200,000 in annual gross sales) will in- 
crease 44%. Adjusting the decline in the number of moderate sized farms for 
those that will become large farms, the net decline is still 29%. Id. at 9. (derived 
from table 1.2). This reduction in the number of total farms will continue the 
already high current rate of fanners leaving agriculture involuntarily. 
Operators of small and moderate-sized farms, the so-called backbone of 
American agriculture, are becoming increasingly less able to compete, 
partly because they lack access to the information and finances [sic] nec- 
essary for adopting the new [agricultural production] technologies effec- 
tively. Many such farmers must relocate, change to other kinds of 
farming, or give up farming altogether. The disappearance of these farm 
operations is causing repercussions for other businesses in the rural com- 
munity and for the [national] labor pool in general, which must absorb 
all those whose livelihood once depend on agricultural production. 
Id. at 3. 
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late 1970s, the succeeding bust in the 1980s, and their impact on farm- 
ers and farm lenders. Part I11 discusses the legal options available to 
farmers and farm creditors when the farm loan is in default. Particu- 
lar attention is paid to the bankruptcy options available to farmers 
prior to chapter 12, and the particular features of chapter 11 and chap- 
ter 13 bankruptcies that made farm reorganizations difficult. Part IV 
provides a brief legislative history of chapter 12, discussing the Con- 
gressional reaction to the failure of farmers to obtain bankruptcy reor- 
ganization relief. Part V discusses chapter 12, including an analysis of 
how to prepare a chapter 12 reorganization plan. 
FARM LENDING AND THE FARM ECONOMY 
The current problems in agriculture are in part a response to the 
farmland boom beginning in the early 1970s. Poor worldwide harvests 
in 1972 and 1974 led Russia to enter the international market in 1976, 
sending already high crop prices soa.ring.4 The high crop prices con- 
tributed to a rise in farm real estate values.5 Other factors contribut- 
ing to land boom include inflation, tax shelter opportunities in 
agriculture, and optimism regarding continued high crop prices. Agri- 
cultural spokesmen, including President Nixon's Secretary of Agri- 
culture Earl Butz, encouraged American farmers to produce 
"fencerow to fencerow" for the export market.6 However, crop prices 
started to decline in the late 1970s, due in part to increased foreign 
4. J. WESSEL, TRADING THE FUTURE ch. 2 (1983). Cash corn prices increased from 
$1.18 in 1972 to $1.78 in 1973, a 51% annual increase. Cash corn prices increased 
again to $2.79 in 1974, a 56% annual increase, and a 136% increase over two years. 
The large drop in crop prices occurred in 1977, when cash corn prices fell from 
$2.42 to $1.97, a 19% annual decline, and a 29% decline from the 1974 peak. DEP'T 
OF AGRIC. ECONOMICS, UNIV. OF NEBRASKA, REPT. NO. 150, CROP AND LIVESTOCK 
PRICES FOR NEBRASKA PRODUCERS (1987). Similar price increases and decreases 
occurred for soybeans and wheat. Id. 
5. The following table indicates the annual percentage changes in Nebraska farm- 
land values: 
Year Change Year Change Year Change 
1970 -5.4% 1976 18.7% 1982 -11.8% 
1971 -2.1% 1977 8.1% 1983 -13.6% 
1972 3.1% 1978 -9.5% 1984 -15.0% 
1973 9.9% 1979 14.4% 1985 -30.5% 
1974 18.8% 1980 5.3% 1986 -20.8% 
1975 5.1% 1981 -0.3% 1987 -10.3% 
REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 40. The land boom began in 1973 
and ended in 1982. The real price of average Nebraska farmland (adjusted for 
inflation increased 91% from 1972 to 1981, and declined 68% from 1981 to 1987. Id. 
The real value of Nebraska farmland is now 61% of its 1972 pre-boom value. Re- 
garding the relationship between crop prices and farm values, see abo Harl, me 
Architecture of Public Policy: The Crisis in Agriculture, 34 KXN.L.REV. 425, 431- 
32 (1986). 
6. J. ANDERSON & J. MORRIS, CHAPTER 12 FARM REORGANIZATIONS 8 1.02 n. 21 
(1987). 
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agricultural production, and high world-wide interest rates. Real es- 
tate value declines started in 1981, attributable in part to falling world 
crop prices and high interest rates from the Reagan administration's 
anti-inflation policy. 
The rising crop and land prices of the early 1970s along with the 
economic promise of producing for the new farm export market made 
farmers and farm lenders bullish regarding agriculture's prospects. 
Farmers, eager to expand, used the steadily increasing land values to 
finance that expansion. Farm lenders were similarly eager to lend, 
taking land with its steadily increasing values as collateral.7 When 
crop prices started to decline in 1977, farm operating losses resulted. 
However, most lenders were still oversecured (collateral value signifi- 
cantly exceeded loan balance) as land prices were still rising, and lend- 
ers were willing to extend the loan. The continuing inflation in land 
values covered questionable loans: even if the farming operation did 
not show a positive cash flow the lender was protected on paper so 
long as collateral values continued to increase annually. At this time 
most farmers and lenders probably expected that the turndown in 
farm prices was temporary, so lenders were willing to carry farmers 
so long as they were oversecured. Hindsight shows that this optimistic 
expectation was incorrect. As land values began to decline, lenders' 
policies became more conservative, particularly as their security posi- 
tion changed from oversecured to only adequately secured to in many 
cases undersecured (collateral value less than loan balance), 
To better understand how these macroeconomic developments af- 
fected agricultural finance, one needs to understand farm credit prac- 
tices. Generally a farmer will have a single operating lender, a bank or 
Production Credit Association (PCA) which supplies the farmer an 
operating line of credit.* In return for this credit the lender will have 
encumbered all or most of the farm assets. Thus, the farmer's operat- 
ing lender will normally have the first secured position on all prop- 
erty. If the farmer had expanded during the land boom, his real estate 
7. The major value of all farm assets, including crops, livestock, equipment, and 
land, is in real estate. In 1981, the peak of the farmland boom, real estate consti- 
tuted 71% of total farm assets. In 1987, after farmland values had fallen by 68%, 
real estate still constituted 60% of all farm assets. REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS, 
supra note 1, at 5. 
8. In 1984 commercial banks extended 51% of the non-real estate farm credit in 
Nebraska, the Commodity Credit Corporation 17%, trade creditors 16%, Produc- 
tion Credit Associations lo%, and the Farmer's Home Administration 6%. Credit 
extended through these operating loans totaled $6 billion. In the last decade the 
proportion of bank and PCA lending declined, government (CCC and FmHA) 
lending increased, and dealer lending was largely unchanged. In 1974 the distri- 
bution of farm debt secured by personal property was banks 62%, PCAs 19%, 
trade creditors 17%, CCC I%, and FmHA 1%. Credit extended totaled $2 billion. 
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ECONO~~IC INDICATORS OF THE FARM SECTOR, March 
1984, 221, 241 (1986). 
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lender would have first priority on the land securing the expansion 
debt. Conventional farm real estate lenders include the Federal Land 
Bank, insurance companies, and private individuals (i.e. landowners 
financing the sale of their land on a contract for deed).g During the 
1970s boom in farmland prices, some farmers borrowed against their 
rising land values to expand their operations through equipment and 
land purchases. These purchases were included in the farmer's oper- 
ating line of credit rather than being set up on a conventional interme- 
diate term note. This led to cash flow problems as farmers had 
financed intermediate asset acquisition on a short term basis. Before 
land prices began to fall many farmers received no credit from trade 
suppliers (seed, feed, chemical, and fuel suppliers). The trade suppli- 
ers were generally paid by the farmer prior to harvest with funds ad- 
vanced by operating lender. The operating loan was paid in turn when 
the crop was harvested and marketed. 
When farmers started developing operating losses and began carry- 
ing an operating deficit, most lenders continued to carry the loan so 
long as they were oversecured. As land values started their rapid de- 
cline, and as it became clear that crop prices would not rebound, the 
operating lender's position became more precarious. Lenders began 
cutting the farmer's operating line of credit off when the loan was in 
default. Lenders did not necessarily foreclose, however, because their 
after acquired property clause gave them first lien on future crops 
even with no further credit advances if the farmer could find other 
operating financing. If the farmer continued to operate, it was often 
due to credit extended by trade suppliers who may have mistakenly 
believed they had the first security position on the new crop. In fact, 
a trade creditor's security interest would come ahead of the operating 
lender's prior security interest and after acquired property clause only 
if the original loan was in default at least six months prior to the 
planting of the new crop.10 Trade creditors were rarely secured. If 
they did obtain a security interest, they generally were subject to the 
operating lender's after acquired property clause.11 
9. In 1984 Federal Land Banks extended 42% of the farm real credit secured by 
estate, individuals 26% (largely through seller financed land contracts), insurance 
companies 16%, Farmer's Home Administration lo%, and banks 6%. Credit ex- 
tended totaled $4.3 billion. Land contract financing and insurance company lend- 
ing declined, while land bank credit increased over the last decade. In 1974 the 
distribution of farm real estate debt was individuals 43%, land banks 24%, insur- 
ance companies 20%, FmHA 9%, and banks 3%. Credit extended totaled $1.5 bil- 
lion. Id. at 220, 240. 
10. NEB. REV. STAT. (U.C.C.) 5 9-312(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986). 
11. Unsecured creditors took some steps to improve their status through trade s u p  
plier lien statutes. Legislation in 1977 established crop liens in favor of those pro- 
viding fertilizers, soil conditioners, or agricultural chemicals or applying such 
products. NEB. REV. STAT. $3 52-1101 to 1104 (1984 & 1986 Cum.Supp.). See Circle 
76 Fertilizer v. Nelson, 219 Neb. 661,365 N.W.2d 460 (1985). In 1985, similar legis- 
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In some cases the farmer and lender were able to restructure the 
farmer's debt through a "workout"; essentially a privately negotiated 
financial reorganization.12 In some cases lenders probably undertook 
workouts where they believed that modest debt restructuring would 
allow the farm to survive and the debts to be repaid. These workouts 
were probably extension agreements, where the lender agrees to ac- 
cept repayment over a longer period of time, reducing current pay- 
ment requirements and improving the debtor's cash flow. These 
workouts probably did not include sigmficant debt write-off (composi- 
tion agreements), in part because there were few effective legal op- 
tions available to farmers facing foreclosure or bankruptcy. While 
farmers can delay foreclosure through a mortgage foreclosure stay or 
by filing bankruptcy, unless the farmer can find alternative financing 
or negotiate a reorganization, his efforts will simply delay the inevita- 
ble.13 Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization was not an effective al- 
ternative to farmers prior to important 1986 Eight Circuit farm 
bankruptcy decisions. Further, chapter 13 debt callings were too low 
for most commercial farmers. If farm debt workout negotiations were 
unsuccessful, or not even pursued, the lender's ultimate option was 
foreclosure, which often led to the farmer's emergency bankruptcy 
filing. 
111. BANKRUPTCY AND NONBANKRUPTCY OPTIONS 
PRIOR TO CHAPTER 12 
If the farmer could not negotiate a workout with his creditors he 
was subject to foreclosure. Foreclosure remedies provide a farmer/ 
debtor various rights. Mortgage foreclosure involves an optional nine 
month stay if so requested by the debtor,l4 and now involves redemp- 
lation established crop liens in favor of thoie supplying seed, andlor electricity to 
farmers. NEB.REV.STAT. $3 52-1201 to 1204 (1986 Cum.Supp.). In addition priority 
issues were clarified in 1985 regarding threshers's liens, veterinarians liens, petro- 
leum products liens, and fertilizer liens. NEB.REV.STAT. $8 52-504,52-702, 52-905, 
521104 (1986 Cum. Supp.). 
12. J. ANDERSON & J. MORRIS, supra note 6, at  9 1.03; R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW 
FUNDAMENTALS 4 1.02 (1987). For a sample farm workout See Stowell, A Case 
Study in Agricultural Workouts and Hearsay (Nebr. Continuing Legal Educ. May 
31, 1985). 
13. The exception to this scenario would be if crop prices (and land prices) rose sub- 
stantially. Most farmers are optimistic and are willing to take this kind of gam- 
ble. They remember the windfall profits cash grain farmers realized in the early 
1970s as the result of poor worldwide harvests and the resulting high feedgrain 
prices. See TRADING THE FUTURE, supra note 4. 
14. NEB.REV.STAT. 8 25-1506. (1985) Mortgage foreclosures are generally governed 
by sections 25-2137 to 2155. If the debtor elects to pursue the one year automatic 
stay, he forfeits his appeal rights. Carley v. Mortgan, 123 Neb. 498, 243 N.W. 631 
(1932). Fkgarding mortgage foreclosures, see Berger, Solving the Problem ofAbu- 
sive M o r t h e  Foreclosure Sales, 66 NEB.L.REV. 373 (1987); Comment, Avoidance 
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tion rights as well as rights to cure default.15 Trust deed foreclosures 
are not subject to a stay but now are subject to redemption rights as 
well as an opportunity to cure default.16 Land contract forfeiture gen- 
erally results in loss of the land.17 Regarding personal property, a per- 
fected secured party may obtain possession of collateral pledged by a 
defaulting farmer and sell it.18 
One way for the farmer to avoid foreclosure prior to chapter 12 was 
to file for reorganization bankruptcy under chapter 11 or chapter 13.19 
The other bankruptcy option for farmers not wishing or able to reor- 
ganize was chapter 7 liquidation. The farmer's bankruptcy options 
prior to chapter 12 were not good. The adequate protection require- 
ment and the absolute priority rule made farm chapter 11 plans virtu- 
ally unconfirmable. In response Congress enacted chapter 12, the 
objective of which is to confirm a farm reorganization plan rather than 
to negotiate one. 
of Foreclosure Sales As Fraudulat Transfers Under Section 548(a) of the Bank- 
ruptcy Code: A n  Impetus to Changing State Foreclosure Procedures, 66 
NEB.L.REV. 383 (1987). 
The Farmer's Home Administration is subject to special administrative fore- 
closure regulations. See Comment, Suing the Farmer's Home Administration- 
Federal Farm Borrowers' Last Stand, 31 S.D.L.REV. 297 (1986); Comment, Agri- 
cultural Law: FmHA Farm Foreclosures, An Analysis of De fmal  Relief and the 
Appeals System, 23 WASHB.L.J. 287 (1984). 
15. Execution upon agricultural land is now subject to special homestead redemption 
rights as well as rights to cure default. NEB.REV.STAT. $8 76-1901-1916 (Supp. 
1987). 
16. Id. Regarding trust deeds see NEB.REV.STAT. 3 76-1001 to 1018 (1986), Butler, 
Trust Deeds Come of Age in Nebraska: A Survey and Analysis, 17 CREIGHTON 
L.J. 283 (1984); Comment, I n  Deed a n  Alternative Security Device: The Nebraska 
Trust Deeds Act, 64 NEB.L.REV. 92 (1985). 
17. Comment, Installment Land Contracts: Remedies in Nebraska, 60 NEB.L.REV. 
750 (1981). 
18. NEB.REV.STAT. (U.C.C.) 8 9-501 et seq. (1980). See Delay First Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745 (1976). 
19. The topic of agricultural bankruptcies has received significant law journal atten- 
tion. Recent articles include: Bland, Insolvencies i n  Farming and Agribusi- 
nesses, 73 KY.L.REV. 795 (1985); R. Hershner & W. Boyer, 27te Farmer in 
Distress--Can Bankmptcy Help? ANN.SURV.BANKR.L. 177 (1985); Looney, The 
Bankruptcy R e f m  Act of 1978 and the Farmer: A Survey of Applicable Pmwi- 
sions, 25 S.D.L.REV. 509 (1980); Kunkel, Farmers' Relief Under the Bankruptcy 
Code: Preserving the Farmers' Property, 29 S.D.L.REV. 303 (1984); Kunkel, The 
Fox Takes Over the Chicken House: Creditor Interfwence W i t h  Farm Manage- 
ment, 60 N.D.L.REv. 795 (1985); Reiley, Fuming  Failures and Drafting Failures: 
The Uncwtain Posture of Crop Financing Under Article 9 and Section 547 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, ANN.SURV.BANKR.L. 29 (1983); Rosentrater, Protecting the 
Lender's Rights When Farmers File for Bankruptcy, 29 S.D.L.REV. 333 (1984). 
For a helpful introduction to the barkuptcy process, see R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY 
LAW FUNDAMENTALS, ch. 1 (1987). 
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A. Chapter 7 Liquidations.20 
Chapter 7 is a liquidation proceeding. Nonexempt assets are liqui- 
dated andor turned over to creditors by a bankruptcy trustee. Filing 
the case initiates an automatic stay against debt collection efforts, and 
generally stops interest accruing on outstanding loans. Exempt assets 
are retained by the debtor and form the basis for the debtor's fresh 
start. Prepetition liens are valid, however, unless avoided in bank- 
ruptcy proceedings. Most debts not paid in chapter 7 are discharged if 
the debtor is an individual, and taxable gains realized through postpe- 
tition liquidation in chapter 7 are not taxed to the debtor even if the 
taxes are not paid in the bankruptcy proceeding. This avoidance of 
taxes arising from asset liquidation and debt forgiveness is one of the 
significant advantages of chapter 7 liquidation over nonbankruptcy 
farm liquidations.21 The bankruptcy trustee may avoid certain prepe- 
tition transactions, including preferential transfers and fraudulent 
conveyances, to increase recovery by creditors. The debtor may avoid 
certain prepetition liens, including liens on certain exempt property. 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy allows a farm debtor to avoid deficiency judg- 
ments and taxes resulting from property liquidation, and allows the 
farm debtor an opportunity for a fresh financial start largely free of 
prepetition debt. 
Eligibility. Chapter 7 cases may be voluntary or involuntary.22 
Farmers are protected from involuntary filings if they meet the bank- 
ruptcy definition of a farmer.23 Farmers are defined by section 
101(19) as a person who has received more than 80 percent of hls gross 
income during the prior taxable year from a farming operation owned 
or operated by that person.24 If a farmer does not qualify as a 
"farmer" under the Code, the farmer is subject to involuntary bank- 
ruptcy.25 Small farmers will more likely not meet the farm income 
20. A brief overview of the structure of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. $9 101 - 
1330, (West 1979) may be helpful. Chapter 1 deals with general provisions 
relevant to all bankruptcy proceedings; chapter 3 deals with with case 
administration (procedure), and chapter 5 deals with creditors, the debtor, and 
the estate; i.e. the substance of bankruptcy case administration. Chapter 7 deals 
tvith liquidation proceedings, chapter 11 deals with business reorganizations, 
chapter 12 deals with family farmer reorganizations, and chapter 13 deals with 
debt adjustment proceedings. Most provisions of chapter 1, 3, and 5 apply to 
chapters 7, and 11-13 unless they are replaced by more specific provisions. 
21. However, taxes arising from prepetition liquidations are not dischargeable but 
can be paid in bankruptcy if the bankruptcy estate has sufficient assets and if the 
debtor makes the short year election. See infra text accompanying notes 91-95. 
22. 11 U.S.C.A. $5 301, 303 (West 1979). 
23. Id. $5 303A, 1112(c). 
24. Farming operation is defined to include "fanning, tillage of the soil, dairy farm- 
ing, ranching, production or raising of crops, poultry, or livestock, and produc- 
tion of poultry or livestock products in an unmanufactured state." Id. 8 lOl(20). 
25. Id. $5 303(h), 303(b). However, farmers who qualify as family farmers are now 
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tests necessary to qualify as a farmer, and therefore will be subject to 
involuntary bankruptcies.26 
Automatic stay. The order of relief (i.e. the filing of a voluntary 
bankruptcy petition27) automatically stays all debt collection activities 
against the debtor.28 The automatic stay is a feature of all bankruptcy 
cases. The stay provides the debtor in any bankruptcy case the oppor- 
tunity to deal with claims of creditors and others in a single proceed- 
ing. The stay gives the debtor some breathing room and prevents one 
creditor from enforcing its lien to the detriment of other creditors.29 
In reorganization cases creditors may petition the court for relief 
from the stay if the debtor is unable to provide adequate protection of 
the creditor's interest, or if the debtor has no equity in the property 
and if it is not necessary for an effective reorganization.30 Once the 
order of relief is entered, interest on secured debts is stayed unless the 
creditor is oversecured, in which case the debtor must pay interest at 
the contract rate to the extent of the equity cushion.31 The order of 
relief stops interest on unsecured debts unless the debtor is solvent, in 
which case interest is paid at the legal rate to the extent of solvency.32 
Bankruptcy estate. When the bankruptcy case is initiated, a sepa- 
rate entity, the bankruptcy estate, is created.33 The bankruptcy estate 
includes property seized by creditors prior to the filing of the peti- 
tion,34 postpetition property acquired by the debtor within 180 days of 
filing, including property received by gift or inheritance,35 and postpe- 
tition proceeds, product, offspring, and rents or profits.36 The inclu- 
also exempt from involuntary chapter 7 cases. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(a). See infra text 
accompanying notes 310-314. 
26. The farm income tests are based on gross income, not net income, ergo most com- 
mercial farmers should easily meet the bankruptcy farm income tests, even if a 
significant portion of their net income is off farm income. Many farmers depend 
significantly on off-farm income, particularly during periods of low crop prices, 
even though off farm income is a relatively small portion of their gross farm 
income. See K. FORSYTHE & B. JOHNSON, DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECONOMICS, UNIV. OF 
NEBRASKA, OFF-FARM INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT IN NEBRASKA: IMPACTS AND 
IMPLICATIONS (Staff Paper No. 6, July 13, 1987). 
27. 11 U.S.C.A. 3 301 (West 1979). 
28. Id. $ 362(a). Actions against the debtor not stayed are enumerated in 5 362(b). 
29. I n  re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 393-94 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 
(1987). 
30. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 362(d) (West 1979). 
31. Id. 506(b). 
32. Id. 8 362(a). Secured claims, administrative expenses, priority unsecured claims, 
and unsecured claims are all paid in full before any interest on unsecured claims 
is paid. Id. 5 726(a)(l)-(5). When interest is paid it is paid at the legal rate, not 
the contract rate. Id. $726(a)(5). 
33. Id. $ 541(a). 
34. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983). 
35. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 541(5) (West 1979). 
36. Id. at $541(6). Postpetition alfalfa cuttings are property of the estate. I n  re Beck, 
61 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985). 
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sion of postpetition property in the bankruptcy estate increases 
payment on unsecured claims, including secured loan deficiencies and 
unsecured creditors. Postpetition personal service income of the 
debtor is not considered property of the estate.37 Filing the bank- 
ruptcy petition usually cuts off an after acquired property clause in a 
security agreement.38 However, if the prepetition security interest 
covers proceeds, products, offspring, rents or profits, the security in- 
terest attaches to such property.39 
Classification of creditors's claims. The bankruptcy claim of a se- 
cured creditor will not necessarily be a secured claim. The concept of 
secured and unsecured differs significantly in bankruptcy from their 
nonbankruptcy meaning. Creditors's claims are secured only to the 
extent of the value of collateral.40 If a creditor is undersecured, i.e. 
the current value of the collateral is less than the outstanding balance 
due, the creditor has a secured claim to the extent of the value of the 
collateral, and an unsecured claim to the extent of the deficiency. For 
example, if the loan balance is $50,000 and the collateral is worth 
$30,000, the loan deficiency is $20,000. The creditor would have a 
$30,000 secured claim and a $20,000 unsecured claim for its $50,000 
debt. Thus the undersecured creditor is both a holder of a secured 
claim and a holder of an unsecured claim in bankruptcy. Given the 
recent decline in agricultural land, most farm lenders are likely to be 
undersecured. Trade creditors, such as seed, fuel, feed and chemical 
dealers, are likely to be unsecured as they traditionally have not re- 
quired collateral as a condition of extending credit. 
Exempt property. Debtors are entitled to claim certain property as 
exempt from creditors's claims in bankruptcy.41 The general effect of 
the exemption is to preclude unencumbered property from liquida- 
tion. Consensual liens on exempted property generally will survive 
bankruptcy42 unless the liens are avoided.43 
37. 11 U.S.C.A. 9 541(6) (West 1979). Custom farming income is not considered prop- 
erty of the estate. In re Lotta Water Land Co., 25 Bankr. 32 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
1982). Exclusions from property of the estate are enumerated at 11 U.S.C.A. 
$ 541(b). (West 1979). The corpus of a spendthrift trust is not property of the 
estate. I n  re Leimer, 54 Bankr. 587 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985). 
38. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 522(a) (West 1979). 
39. Id. 5 522(b); I n  re Hillyard, 48 Bankr. 10 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); I n  re Lawrence, 
41 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In  re Jackels, 55 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1985); In  re Beck, 61 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985); In  re Wobig, 73 Bankr. 292 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). See Kunkel, Walter & Lander, The Reach of Prefiling 
Security Interests in Postfiling Proceeds of Agricultural Collateral-An Analy- 
sis of Bankruptcy Code Section 552, 8 ~.AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 311 (1987). 
40. 11 U.S.C.A. 4 506(a) (West 1979). 
41. Id. $522. See generally, Duncan, Through The Trap Door Darklg: Nebraska Ea; 
m p t i o n  Policy and the Bankruptcy R e f m  Act of 1978, 60 NEB.L.REV. 219 
(1981). 
42. 11 U.S.C.A. $522(c)(2) (West 1979). 
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The major personal property exemptions in Nebraska include: all 
immediate personal possessions;44 kitchen utensils and household fur- 
niture up to $1500;45 professional tools or equipment up to $1500;46 six 
months food and fuel;47 an additional $2500 wildcard personal prop- 
erty exemption for debtors not qualifying for the homestead exemp- 
tion;48 up to $10,000 cash value in a life insurance policy49 and/or 
annuity,so and most retirement plans.51 The homestead real estate 
property exemption is $lO,OOO,52 although the exemption may be 
waived for mortgages.53 Judicial liens and nonpossessory, nonpur- 
chase money liens in certain exempt personal property, including pro- 
fessional tools, may be voided in bankruptcy if the property is held 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.54 
Tmtee's avoiding powers. The bankruptcy trustee may avoid cer- 
tain prepetition transactions, including preferential transfers55 and 
fraudulent conveyances.56 Any property recovered by the trustee in- 
creases the recovery of unsecured claimants at the expense of the 
party (typically secured) giving up the property recovered. 
Preferential transfers. Preferential transfers are prepetition 
43. Id. $ 522(f). 
44. NEB.REV.STAT. $ 25-1556(1) (1985). 
45. Id. $ 25-1556(2). 
46. Id. This exemption may be claimed by both spouses in a joint case. I n  re Keller, 
50 Bankr. 23 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985). 
47. NEB.REV.STAT. $ 25-1556(2) (1985). 
48. Id. 9 25-1552. This would include a head of household whose homestead exemp- 
tion was ineffective against a mortgagee. NEB.REV.STAT. $40-103 (1984). A wife 
is entitled to claim this wildcard exemption even though her husband claimed a 
homestead exemption. In re Hartmann, 19 Bankr. 844 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982). See 
a b o  I n  re Welborne, 63 Bankr. 23 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986). 
49. NEB.REV.STAT. $ 44-371 (Supp. 1987). Sickness and accident insurance proceeds 
up to $200 per month are also exempt, as are disability lump-sum settlements. Id. 
$5  44-754- to 755 (1984), 25-1563.01 - 1563.02 (Supp. 1987). But see id. $ 44-755. 
Insurance benefits from fraternal societies were completely exempt prior to Au- 
gust 29, 1987. Id. $44-1089 (Cum.Supp. 1986), amended (Supp. 1987). 
50. Id. $ 44-371 (Supp. 1987). Prior to August 29, 1987, annuities in any amount were 
exempt. Cf. id.  (1984). Under current law up to $10,000 in life insurance cash 
values, annuities, and fraternal society insurance proceeds are exempt. Id. $$ 44- 
371, 44-1089 (Supp. 1987). The new exemptions apply to cases filed after August 
29, 1987. 1987 Neb. Laws, LB 335 sec. 6. 
51. NEB.REV.STAT. $$ 25-1563.01 (Supp. 1987). 
52. NEB.REV.STAT. 9 40-101 (Cum.Supp. 1986). For married spouses, only the hus- 
band is entitled to claim the homestead exemptions as the head of household. In 
re Hartmann, 19 Bankr. 844 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982). 
53. NEB.REV.STAT. $ 40-103 (Reissue 1984). See id. $6 40-101 to -117. 
54. 11 U.S.C.A. $522(f) (West 1979). Federal agencies are subject to exemptions on 
the same basis as any other creditor. In re Kight, 49 Bankr. 437 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1985); In  re Bubert, 61 Bankr. 362 (W.D. Tex. 1986), aff '8 809 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Victory Highway Village, Inc., 662 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1981). 
55. 11 U.S.C.A. 5; 547 (West 1979). 
56. Id. $9 548, 544. 
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transfers to favored (or, perhaps, insistent) creditors. For instance, a 
farmer who in good faith sells crops and livestock pledged to his oper- 
ating creditor, takes the sale proceeds, pays family living expenses and 
local trade creditors, and is unable to pay the operating creditor in full, 
may have made a preferential transfer. Another scenario is where the 
debtor anticipates filing bankruptcy and pays favored creditors in full 
before filing. Finally, a creditor may coerce a debtor into making pay- 
ments in or outside of the regular course of business, or may setoff 
mutual debts. Any of these prepetition transactions may constitute 
preferential transfers that could be voided by the bankruptcy trustee. 
The Bankruptcy Code defines preferential transfers as a transfer 
of the debtor's property to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on 
account of an antecedent debt of the debtor. The transfer must have 
been made while the debtor was insolvent,57 within 90 days of the 
bankruptcy petition (one year for insiders,58) and enabling the credi- 
tor to receive more than the liquidated value of the creditor's claim if 
the transfer had not been made.59 Such transfers are not void, but are 
voidable by the trustee.60 Transfers not considered preferential trans- 
fers include transfers for new value and transfers made in the ordi- 
nary course of busine~s.6~ The trustee has the burden of proving that 
the transfer is voidable, while the creditor has the burden of proving 
that it qualifies for an exception.62 If the trustee succeeds in voiding 
the preferential transfer, the property becomes property of the estate 
and is available for distribution to creditors. The creditor who re- 
ceived the transfer loses the benefit of his preference, and obtains only 
the liquidated value of his claim, while the recovery of other creditors, 
particularly those holding unsecured claims, is increased accordingly. 
Fraudulent conveyances. Occasionally a desperate creditor may 
seek to keep property, encumbered or unencumbered, from creditors. 
Property may be transferred to relatives or other insiders as a gift or 
for less than full market value. The transfer of encumbered property 
denies the secured creditor its collateral. The transfer of unencum- 
bered property denies the undersecured creditor property it could 
reach through a deficiency judgment, as well as property that should 
be available to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors. A more re- 
- -- - 
57. A debtor is presumed to be insolvent on and during the 90 days prior to filing a 
bankruptcy petition. Id. $547(f). Insolvency is defined as debts exceeding fairly 
valued assets. Id. 8 lOl(31). 
58. Insiders are broadly defined to include relatives and business associates. Id. 
$101(30). 
59. Id. $ 547(b). Regarding the determination of a claim's liquidated value, see infra 
note 131 and text accompanying notes 475-81. 
60. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 547(6) (West 1979); See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 10 
C.B.C.2d 1413, 733 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1984). 
61. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 547 (c) (West 1979). 
62. Id. $ 547(g). 
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cent issue raised in this area of the law is whether foreclosure sales 
for significantly less than full market value constitute fraudulent 
conveyances.63 
The Bankruptcy Code has two provisions dealing with fraudulent 
conveyances, one relying on state law and the second relying on bank- 
ruptcy law. Section 544 allows the trustee to void transfers defined as 
fraudulent under state law if a unsecured claim holder exists in the 
case.64 Section 548 allows the trustee to void fraudulent transfers 
made (whether voluntary or involuntary) and obligations incurred, 
within one year before filing the bankruptcy petition, when the intent 
of the transaction was to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.65 The 
section 544 fraudulent conveyances authority is significantly more 
powerful than that available under section 548: conveyances for less 
than fair consideration may be fraudulent without actual fraudulent 
intent, and conveyances up to four years prior to bankruptcy may be 
challenged. 
The section 544 power to avoid fraudulent transfers depends upon 
state law to define whether a transfer is fraudulent. Nebraska has 
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act.66 The major fea- 
ture of the act is that conveyances made by debtors for less than ade- 
quate consideration are fraudulent per se against creditors even 
where the debtor lacked actual fraudulent intent.67 Such transac- 
tions include conveyances which render the debtor insolvent,68 con- 
veyances which leave a the debtor's business undercapitalized,69 and 
conveyances made when the debtor believes he is unable to pay debts 
as they mature.70 Conveyances by debtors are also fraudulent when 
undertaken with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.71 
The statute of limitations is four years, significantly longer than the 
one year fraudulent conveyance limitation of section 548(a)(1).72 
63. 11 U.S.C.A. $101(50)(West 1979); In r e  Ruebeck, 55 Bankr. 163 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1985); In re Hulm, 11 C.B.C.2d 152, 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 19841, cwt. denied, 469 
U.S. 990, 1984. See Berger, supra note 14; Comment, supra note 14. 
64. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 544(b) (West 1979) See In re Falcone, BK83-736 (D. Neb. 1985); In 
re  Kock, 20 Bankr. 453 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982). 
65. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 548(a)(l)(West 1979). 
66. NEB.REV.STAT. $5 36-601 to -613 (1984). 
67. Id. $ 36-601. 
68. Id. $ 36-604, 36-602. 
69. Id. $ 36-605. 
70. Id. $ 36-606. 
71. Id. $ 36-607. Regarding fraudulent conveyances of partnership assets see id. $ 36- 
608. 
72. Id. $25-207 (1985). The statute probably begins to run upon discovery of facts 
constituting the fraud or facts sufficient to put an ordinarily intelIigent and pru- 
dent person on inquiry which if pursued would lead to such discovery. Abels v. 
Bennett, 158 Neb. 699, 64 N.W.2d 481 (1954); Hollenbeck v. Guardian Nat'l Life 
Ins. Co., 144 Neb. 684, 14 N.W.2d 330 (1944). Creditors may have a fraudulent 
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Proper& distribution. Property distribution in a chapter 7 bank- 
ruptcy case is first to secured claim holders before unsecured claim 
holders, although special rules apply to unsecured priority bankruptcy 
claims. A creditor with an allowed claim secured by a lien against 
property of the estate is entitled to repayment of the debt to the ex- 
tent of the collateral before any other creditor is paid from the es- 
tateY3 If the creditor is oversecured, i.e. if the collateral value 
exceeds the secured claim, the secured creditor may recover postpeti- 
tion interest up to the amount of the equity cushion.74 If the creditor 
is undersecured, i.e. the amount of the debt exceeds the collateral fair 
market value, the balance of the claim (i-e. the deficiency balance) is 
treated as an unsecured claim.75 
Once holders of secured claims have received their collateral or its 
value, any remaining property is available for distribution to holders 
of unsecured claims. However, certain unsecured claims are entitled 
to priority treatment in that they will be satisfied first in full before 
any distribution is made to general holders of unsecured claims. 
There are seven priority claims categories, the most important of 
which in farm liquidations typically are administrative expenses76 
and allowed unsecured tax claims.77 A priority category must be paid 
in full before claimants in a lower priority category receive anything.78 
If there are not sufficient assets to pay a priority class in full, the 
members receive a pro rata share.79 
After the payment of priority unsecured claims, any remaining 
property is available for distribution to the remaining unsecured cred- 
conveyance set aside unless the purchaser is an innocent purchaser for value. 
NEB.REV.STAT. 9 36-609 (1984). 
73. 11 U.S.C.A. 9 506(a) (West 1979). The value used is the collateral's fair market 
value. I n  re Courtright, 57 Bankr. 495 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1986). 
74. I1 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1979); I n  re Glenn, 796 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1986). But 
see I n  re Churchfield, 62 Bankr. 399 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986). The recovery of 
postpetition interest by oversecured creditors reduces the amount of property 
available to satisfy unsecured claims. 
75. 11 U.S.C.A. 506(a) (West 1979). 
76. Id. 507(a)(l). Administrative expenses include unpaid filings fees, costs associ- 
ated with preserving the estate, taxes incurred by the estate, and trustee compen- 
sation. Id. 8 503(b). Trustee's fees are limited in a chapter 7 case to a maximum 
of up to 15% of the first $1000 in cash disbursed to creditors, 6% for cash disburse- 
ments between $1000 and $3000, and 3% for cash disbursement amounts exceed- 
ing $3000. Id. § 326(a). Property turned over to secured creditors is not included 
in the trustee's fee calculations. H. R. REPT. NO. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 327 
(1977), reprinted in 5 U.S.CONG. & ADM. NEWS 5787 (1978). But cf. 11 U.S.C.A. 
$506(c) (West 1979) 50G(c). Trustee's fees must be reasonable. Id. 8 330(a)(l). 
Regarding debtors's attorney fees see id. 329. 
77. Id. 5 507(a)(7). 
78. Id. 5 726(a)(1). 
79. Id. 5 726(b). 
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itors.80 If any property remains after unsecured claims have been 
paid, interest is paid at the legal rate from the date of filing on any 
unsecured claim (including priority unsecured clairns).gl Any re- 
maining property is paid to the debtor.82 
Debt discharge. Most debts not paid through the chapter 7 liquida- 
tion process are discharged if the debtor is an individual.83 Major ex- 
ceptions to discharge include: certain prepetition taxes,g4 unscheduled 
claims,85 and claims based on the receipt of money, property, or serv- 
ices obtained by fraud, false pretenses or a materially false written 
statement about the debtor's financial condition made to deceive cred- 
itors and reasonably relied upon thereby.86 A discharge will be denied 
where the debtor has committed fraud in connection with the case.87 
A discharge cannot be obtained if the debtor received a discharge 
under chapter 7 in a case begun within six years before filing the peti- 
tion.88 Debts otherwise entitled to discharge may be affirmed if the 
affirmation is in writing, was made after the order of relief, and has 
been approved by the court.89 Creditors or the trustee may object to 
debt discharge on the basis that the debtor is not entitled thereto.90 
Income taxes. Taxable gains realized through liquidating assets in 
chapter 7 are not taxed to the debtor even if the taxes are not paid in 
the bankruptcy proceeding.91 Taxes arising from prepetition liquida- 
tions may also be paid in bankruptcy (at the expense of unsecured 
claim holders) if sufficient assets exist and if the debtor takes the 
short year election. The debtor may elect to end his tax year the day 
before he files bankruptcy.92 If he does so the tax claim becomes a 
priority expense, which may then be paid as part of the bankruptcy 
proceedings before unsecured claims are paid.93 Any unpaid taxes 
80. Id. $ 726(a). 
81. Id. $ 726(a)(5). 
82. Id. $ 726(a)(6). 
83. Id. § 523. 
84. Id. 8 523(a)(l). 
85. Id. 8 727(a)(3). 
86. Id. 9 727(a)(2). 
87. Id. $ 727(a)(2)-(7). 
88. Id. $ 727(a)(8). 
89. 11 U.S.C.A. 8 729(a)(lO)(West 1979). 
90. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 727(c). 
91. I.R.C. 8 6012(a)(9)(West 1986). See Flaccus, Taxes, Farmers, and Bankruptcy and 
the 1986 Tax Changes: Much Has Changed But Much Has Remained the Same, 66 
NEB.L.REV. 459 (1987); McCobb, Tax Planning for Farmers Under Financial Dis- 
tress, 5 J.AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 76 (1983); Moratzka, A Fanner's Tax Liability i n  the 
Event of Liquidation I n  or Out of Bankmptcy, 30 S.D.L.REV. 198 (1985); Shepard, 
The Bankruptcy Tax Act and the Bankruptcy Code: A Study Wi th  Refwence to 
the Distressed Farm Economy, ANN.SURV.BANKR.L. 159 (1986). 
92. I.R.C. 5 1398 (d)(2). See Flaccus, supra note 91, at 462-64. 
93. 11 U.S.C. 507 (a)(7). 
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arising from prepetition liquidations are not discharged.94 The possi- 
bility of being able to avoid taxes arising from asset liquidation and 
debt forgiveness is one of the significant advantages of chapter 7 liqui- 
dation over nonbankruptcy liquidations.95 
B. Chapter 11 Reorganizations.96 
Chapter 11 is a reorganization proceeding, the purpose of which is 
to save the debtor's business by restructuring his finances. The re- 
structuring may involve an extension agreement, where creditors are 
paid in full but repayment terms are extended; a composition agree- 
ment, where creditors accept reductions in the amount repaid; or some 
combination of the two. In a voluntary chapter 11 case the petitioner 
proposes a reorganization plan to creditors, a majority of which must 
approve the plan. The usual focus of a chapter 11 proceeding is the 
negotiation of the reorganization plan between the debtor and his 
creditors. If the plan is disapproved by creditors, a cramdown plan 
may be approved by the bankmptcy court over the objection of dis- 
senting creditors if the creditors receive at least the liquidation value 
of their claim, subject to the absolute priority rule. Chapter 11 pro- 
ceedings are often marked by considerable litigation, typically regard- 
ing relief from the automatic stay and use of cash collateral.97 
Eligibility. Chapter 11 cases may be voluntary or involuntary 
although farmers are exempted from involuntary proceedings.98 
However, involuntary plans (including liquidating plans) may be filed 
by creditors in a voluntary case if the farmer has not proposed a reor- 
94. Id. 8 527 (a) (1) (A). 
95. However, if assets are abandoned by the trustee pursuant to 9 554(a) as having 
inconsequential or no value to the estate, i.e. where the debtor has little or no 
equity in the assets, the debtor may realize gain when the assets are repossessed 
by creditors. See Mason v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1980); I n  re 
Sonner, 53 Bankr. 859 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); See abo Flaccus, supra note 91, at 
482-84. 
96. See generally R. AARON, supra note 19, 9 1.04; Anderson and Rainach, F a m e r  
Reorganizations Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 28 LOYOLA L.REv. 439 (1982); 
Landers, Reorganizing a Farm Business Under Chapter 11,5 J.AGRIC. TAX'N & 
L. 11 (1983). 
97. See R. AARON, supra note 19, 4 1.04 at 1-13 to 1-14. 
98. 11 U.S.C.A. $9 301,303 (West 1979). Normally farmers are exempt from involun- 
tary bankruptcy proceedings. Id. 8 303(a). If up to but not more than 80% of the 
farmer's gross income was not from farming in the year prior to filing, however, 
the farmer not a farmer for bankruptcy purposes, and therefore is subject to an 
involuntary filing. Id. 4 lOl(19). Many small farmers with significant off-farm 
income cannot meet the 80% gross income test and therefore are subject to invol- 
untary bankruptcies. See Dole, The Availability and Utility of Chapter 13 of the 
Bankmptcy Code To F a m m  Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 16 
TEXAS TECH L.REv. 433, 440 n.53 (1985). Now farmers qualifying as family farm- 
ers are also exempt from involuntary chapter 11. proceedings. 11 U.S.C.A. 303(a). 
See infra text accompanying notes 310-17. 
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ganization plan within 120 days.99 
Debtor in possession. The debtor's business is operated during 
bankruptcy proceedings by the debtor acting as the debtor in posses- 
sion.100 The debtor in possession will be replaced by an independent 
trustee only upon a showing of fraud, incompetence, or gross misman- 
agement.101 The debtor in possession enjoys all the powers of a bank- 
ruptcy trustee, including the lien avoidance powers.lo2 The debtor in 
possession will operate the business unless the bankruptcy court inter- 
venes at the request of a party in interest203 Overseeing the debtor in 
possession is the statutory creditors's committee which is typically 
made up of trade creditors willing to serve.104 The committee is re- 
sponsible for supervising the management efforts of the debtor in pos- 
session as well as attempting to negotiate an acceptable reorganization 
plan.105 
Operating the business. The debtor is allowed to operate its busi- 
ness in the normal course although certain actions require bankruptcy 
court approval. The debtor may use, sell or lease property of the es- 
tate in the normal course of business without court approval.106 If the 
sale or property use falls outside the normal course of business, court 
approval is required after notice and an opportunity for a hearing if 
one is requested.107 The debtor in possession may also affirm or dis- 
affirm executory contracts and leases,*os as well as cure any de- 
99. The debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days within the order of 
relief. 11 U.S.C. 5 1121(b). (1982) The date of the order of relief is the date the 
bankruptcy petition was filed in a voluntary chapter 11 case. Id. $301. A creditor 
may file a plan, including a liquidating plan, after 120 days. Id. $ 1121(c)(2); In  re 
Button Hook Cattle Co. Inc., 747 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1984); In  re Jasik, 727 F.2d 
1379 (5th Cir. 1984). See Note, Bankruptcy Law and the Farmer: Are Farmers 
Really E m p t  From Forced Liquidation Under Chapter 11 ?, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 
264 (1986). 
100. 11 U.S.C. $1101(1)(1982). 
101. Id. 5 1104(a)(l). Alternatively the bankruptcy court may appoint an examiner 
rather than replace the debtor in possession. Id. 5 1104(b). Either alternative is 
rarely used. See Aaron, supra note 19, $ 1.04 at 1-15. 
102. 11 U.S.C. $1107(1982). 
103. Id. $1108. 
104. Id. $341. 
105. Id. 5 1103. 
106. Id. 8 363(c). 
107. Id. $9 363(b), 102(a), Bankruptcy Rules 9007, 9013, and 9014 (Supp.111 1985). 
108. 11 U.S.C. $1123(a)(5)(G) (1982). In farm bankruptcies a controversial issue is 
whether land contracts are contracts which may be disaffirmed, or whether the 
land contract was really a lien created for financing the real estate sale. For a 
case holding that a land contract is not an executory contract, see In  re Booth, 19 
Bankr. 53 (D. Utah 1982). See also Grossman, Installment Land Contracts for the 
Sale of Farmland: Some Considerations in Bankruptcy, 8 J.AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 
208 (1986); Grossman, Pre-Bankruptcy Forfeiture of Installment Land Contracts 
for the Sale of Farmland, 8 J.AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 357 (1987). Regarding farm 
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faults.109 Special procedures must be followed to use cash collateral. 
Cash collateral is broadly defined to include any sale of pledged inven- 
tory or equipment or collection of accounts.llo The debtor in posses- 
sion may not use cash collateral without consent of the secured party 
or a court hearing which considers whether the interest of the secured 
party is adequately protected.111 Secured claimants are also entitled 
to adequate protection of their collateral if it is used in operating the 
business and the creditor requests relief from the automatic stay.112 
Operating credit. Postpetition trade creditors who do business 
with the debtor in possession may be paid immediately.ll3 Trade cred- 
itors have first priority unsecured claim as an administrative ex- 
pense.114 If operating creditors are unwilling to extend credit on such 
terms, they may be granted a "superpriority" lien on property of the 
estate with bankruptcy court approval if existing lienors on the same 
collateral are adequately protected (i.e. oversecured).*l5 
Reorganization plan. While the debtor in possession is operating 
the business, the debtor is also negotiating a reorganization plan with 
his creditors. The debtor in possession has an exclusive right to pro- 
pose a reorganization plan within 120 days after the order of relief is 
entered.116 Thereafter, unless an extension is granted, any party in 
interest may propose a plan,ll7 including a liquidating plan.118 The 
plan may involve an extension or composition, a partial liquidation, or 
a bulk sale to another entity. The procedural steps to reach agree- 
ment on a plan include negotiation among the debtor in possession, 
the creditors's committee, secured claim holders, and equity holders 
(if any). 
The plan must group the creditors' claims by class according to 
their legal interests.119 Typical groupings are made as follows: (1) 
each secured claim holder is placed in an individual class, (2) un- 
secured claim holders owed small amounts are grouped in a class, (3) 
all priority unsecured claims are grouped in a class, and (4) all other 
leases in bankruptcy see Grossman & Fischer, The Farm Lease i n  Bankruptcy: A 
Comprehensive Analysis, 59 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 598 (1984). 
109. 11 U.S.C. 5 365 (1982). The rejected contract obligor or lessor has a claim for the 
breach of contract. Id. $5 365(g), 502. 
110. Id. $ 363(a). 
111. Id. $9 363(c)(2), 363(c)(3), 361. See also infra text accompanying notes 167-78. 
112. 11 U.S.C. 362(d)(1) (1982). See ubo infru text accompanying notes 149-66. 
113. Id. 5 364(a). 
114. Id. $5 364(a), 503(b)(l)(A), 507(1). 
115. Id. $ 364(~)-(d). 
116. Id. 3 1121(b). If an independent trustee has been appointed, the debtor loses the 
exdusive right to propose a plan during the first 120 days of the case. Id. 
$1121(c)(l); Bankruptcy Rule 3017 (Supp.111 1985). 
117. 11 U.S.C. 5 1121(c). 
118. Id. 5 1123(b)(4). See Comment, supra note 99. 
119. Id. 4 1122; Bankruptcy Rule 3013 (Supp.111 1985). 
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unsecured claim holders are placed in a class.120 The plan must iden- 
tify how each class will be treated91 It will typically be proposed that 
the class of small unsecured claims be paid in ful1.122 The priority 
claims must be proposed to be paid in full, although payment may be 
deferred.123 Proper grouping is important to obtaining successful ac- 
ceptance of the plan. Classes vote according to a weighted major- 
ity.124 For creditors, the weighted majority is one half of the class by 
number and two thirds by debt amount.125 Only those claims voting 
are counted. All classes must accept the plan to avoid a cramdown;lz6 
if one class dissents the plan has been defeated. A single secured 
claim holder therefore may unilaterally defeat a plan if that particular 
creditor's class (of which the creditor would typically be the only 
member) votes against the plan. 
Only impaired classes actually vote on a proposed reorganization 
plan. A class which will be paid in full under the plan is not impaired 
and therefore is deemed to have accepted the plan without a vote.27 
Typically the classes of small unsecured claims and priority claims are 
unimpaired in a proposed reorganization plan. A class which is of- 
fered nothing under the plan, e.g. unsecured creditors, is deemed to 
have rejected the plan without a vote.128 Impaired claims, those (typi- 
cally secured) which will not be paid in full under the plan but which 
would receive some payment will vote on the plan. 
Once the debtor in possession proposes a plan, the debtor may can- 
vass the impaired classes.129 The bankruptcy court must approve the 
debtor's disclosure statement prepared to adequately inform the im- 
paired classes regarding the plan.130 The plan must indicate how all 
classes will be treated, whether a class is impaired, and the liquidated 
value of all claims.131 After the disclosure statement has been ap- 
proved, the ballots are distributed to the impaired classes along with 
120. See R. AARON, supra note 19, 4 1.04 at 1-21 to 1-22. 
121. 11 U.S.C. 8 1123(a)(2), 1123(a)(3) (1982). 
122. This is so that at least one class will be deemed to have accepted the plan in case a 
cramdown is attempted. Id. 3 1126(f). See also infra text accompanying notes 
131-34. 
123. 11 U.S.C. $3 1123(a)(l), 1129(a)(9) (1982). 
124. Bankruptcy Rule 3018 (Supp. 111 1985). 
125. 11 U.S.C. 1126(c) (1982). 
126. Id. 4 1129(a)(8). 
127. Id. 4 1126(f). This also applies to claims where prepetition default is proposed to 
be cured under the plan. Id. at 5 1124(2). 
128. Id. $1126(g). 
129. Id. $ 1125. 
130. Id. 5 1125(b). 
131. R. AARON, supra note 19, $1.04 at  1-23. The liquidated value of a claim is what 
the claimant would receive in chapter 7 bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. $1129(a)(7)(1982). 
This is referred to as the best interests of creditors. Under the reorganization, 
creditors are guaranteed that they will receive at least what they would have 
received in bankruptcy liquidation proceedings. 
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the disclosure statement132 and, typically, a copy of the reorganization 
plan itself. 
Confirmation standards. After the impaired classes have voted 
the bankruptcy court holds a confirmation hearing.133 The plan can 
be confirmed only if all. confirmation requirements are met.134 One 
requirement is that all creditors receive as a minimum the liquidated 
value of their claim.135 In addition, the plan must be feasible, i.e. un- 
likely to result in liquidation or further reorganization.136 Each im- 
paired class must have voted to accept the plan by weighted 
majority.137 If an impaired class has rejected the plan, it cannot be 
confirmed unless additional confirmation requirements, the 
cramdown requirements, are met. 
The purpose of the cramdown option is t ~ ' ~ r e v e n t  a holdout credi- 
tor from unreasonably blocking plan confirmation. To be approved by 
the bankruptcy court over the objection of an impaired class, a 
cramdown reorganization plan must not discriminate unfairly among 
impaired classes, and it must be fair and equitable regarding impaired 
classes.13s Fair and equitable treatment of impaired secured claims 
means that under the plan (1) the secured claim holder will retain its 
lien, and receive deferred cash payments totaling at least the value of 
the collateral as of the plan's effective date, (2) the proceeds of any 
sale of collateral is subject to the secured claim holder's lien, or (3) the 
secured claim holder realizes the "indubitable equivalent" of its 
claim.139 Fair and equitable treatment of impaired unsecured claims 
(which includes the unsecured claims of undersecured creditors) 
means that under the plan (1) unsecured claim holders will receive or 
retain property valued on the effective date of the plan equal to the 
allowed amount of the claim (i.e. the claim is paid in full), or (2) that 
no junior claim or interest will receive or retain any property (the 
absolute priority rule).l40 Thus, for the debtor to retain any property 
under the plan all dissenting impaired unsecured claims must be paid 
in full, even if the liquidated value of such claims is zero.141 
Section 1111@)(2) election.142 One additional option available to 
132. Bankruptcy Rule 3017(d)(Supp.III 1985). 
133. 11 U.S.C. 5 1128 (1982). 
134. Id. 5 1129(a). 
135. Id. 5 1129(a)(7). See supra note 131. 
136. Id. 5 1129(a)(ll). An exception is if the plan is a liquidating plan. Id. 
137. Id. 5 1129(a)(8). 
138. Id. 1129(b)(l). See Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down 
U& the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.BANKFLL.J. 133 (1979). 
139. 11 U.S.C. $1129(b)(2)(A)(1982). 
140. Id. 5 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). See a k o  i g r a  text accompanying notes 179-91. 
141. This applies to individual reorganizations. For corporate reorganizations, dissent- 
ing impaired creditors would need to be paid in full before shareholders could 
receive anything. 
142. See Pusateri, Swartz & Shaiken, Section llll(b) of the Bankwptcy Code: How 
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undersecured creditors that can further complicate plan acceptance is 
the section l l l l (b)(2) election. Generally an undersecured creditor's 
claim is divided into a secured claim to the extent of the collateral 
value, and an unsecured claim for the deficiency.143 Section l l l l (b)(2) 
authorizes a class of unsecured claimants that include undersecured 
creditors to elect to have the claim treated as secured to the extent of 
the entire claim, not simply to the extent of the collateral value, and 
to waive the deficiency clairn.144 This provides the undersecured cred- 
itor with some interesting options. If the creditor has enough votes to 
reject the plan it will not make the l l l l (b)(2) election. However, if 
the undersecured creditor does not have the votes to control the class, 
it can make the l l l l (b)(2) election. If the plan is approved, the under- 
secured creditor gains the opportunity to share in any appreciation of 
the collateral up to the full amount of the allowed claim, rather than 
being limited to the asset's value on the effective date of the plan. 
Effect of confirnation. A confirmed plan (whether creditor ap- 
proved or cramdown) binds all parties, vests all property in the debtor 
(subject to the plan's debt repayment requirements), and effects a dis- 
charge on the unpaid portion of debts.145 A discharge cannot be ob- 
tained if the debtor received a chapter 11 discharge in a case begun 
within six years before filing the petition.146 If the plan is not con- 
firmed, the bankruptcy court is likely to approve a creditor's liquidat- 
ing plan if one has been filed, or to dismiss the case and leave creditors 
to their state debt collection remedies. 
Problems with chapter 11 famz reorganizations. Confirmation of a 
chapter 11 reorganization plan has been difficult for farmers since un- 
successful reorganizations have resulted in liquidation.147 The major 
legal obstacles have been the adequate protection requirement, cash 
collateral disputes, and the absolute priority rule. While the 1986 
Ahlersl48 decision has relaxed both the adequate protection and the 
absolute priority rules in farm chapter 11 reorganizations in the Eight 
Much Does the Debtor Have to Pay and Whm Should the Creditor Elect?, 58 
AM.BANKR.L.J. 129 (1984). 
143. 11 U.S.C. $ 506(a) (1982); See also supra text accompanying note 40. 
144. 11 U.S.C. $ l l l l(b)(2) (1982). Undersecured creditors are ineligible for the 
$ llll(b)(2) election if their claims are worthless or of little value, or if the loan is 
with recourse and the collateral will be sold under the plan or while the case is 
being administered. Id. 5 llll(b)(l)(a)(ii). In the latter case the creditor will 
have an opportunity to bid on the collateral at sales and would still have an un- 
secured claim for any deficiency. 
145. Id. $ 1141. 
146. Id. 9 727(a)(8). 
147. If the farmer's reorganization plan was not confirmed and a liquidating plan had 
been filed, the farmer would be subject to involuntary liquidation. See supm note 
99 and accompanying text. Otherwise, the automatic stay would be lifted and 
creditors would then be free to pursue debt collection remedies. 
148. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (1987). 
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Circuit, the prior inability for farmers to successfully reorganize in 
chapter 11 was a major factor leading to enactment of chapter 12. 
Adequate protection. A major stumbling block to successful chap- 
ter 11 farm reorganizations is the adequate protection requirement. 
Secured creditors are entitled to receive adequate protection of the 
value of their collateral in reorganization proceedings.l*g The issue is 
raised when a creditor requests relief from the automatic stay. Credi- 
tors may petition the bankruptcy court for relief from the stay if the 
debtor is unable to provide adequate protection of the creditor's inter- 
est, or if the debtor has no equity in the property and it is not neces- 
sary for an effective reorganization.ls0 What constitutes adequate 
protection is not defined by the Code, but does include cash payments, 
periodic cash payments, an additional or replacement lien to compen- 
sate the creditor for a decrease in the value of its collatera1,lsl or such 
other relief that will allow the secured party to realize the indubitable 
equivalent of its interest in the property.152 In farm cases this would 
include any collateral value declines resulting from normal asset de- 
preciation plus any land value declines. If the debtor cannot provide 
adequate protection, the secured creditor is entitled to obtain relief 
from the automatic stay and to pursue state law debt collection reme- 
dies.153 To provide adequate protection the debtor must give the se- 
cured creditor cash payments or additional collateral to the extent 
that the bankruptcy stay or use of the collateral reduces collateral 
value.154 In addition the secured creditor is allowed to realize the "in- 
dubitable equivalent" of its interest in the collateral.l55 Some (but not 
all) courts have ruled that the indubitable equivalent includes com- 
pensating the creditor for the loss of the right to foreclose, the right of 
reinvestment, and other lost opportunity costs.156 These cases have 
awarded creditors postpetition interest payments on the value of the 
collateral in addition to cash payments for any decline in collateral 
value.157 However, the Eighth Circuit has taken a more limited ap- 
proach, ruling that adequate protection may include postpetition in- 
149. 11 U.S.C. $361(1982). See Molbert, Adequate Protection for the Undersecured 
Creditor in  a Chapter 11 Rem-ganizatiox Compensation for the Delay in Enforc- 
ing Foreclosure Rights, 60 N.D.L.REv. 515 (1984). 
150. Id. 9 362(d). 
151. Id. 5 361(1)-(2). 
152. Id. 3 361(3). 
153. Id. 5 362(d)(l). 
154. Id. $8 361(1)-(2). 
155. Id. 3 361(3). 
156. In re American Mariner Indus. Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984); Grundy Nat'l 
Bank v. Tandem Mining Crop., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985). Contra In re Timbers 
of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986). 
157. Normally, postpetition interest on secured debts is stayed unless the creditor is 
oversecured in which case the debtor must pay interest at  the contract rate to the 
extent of the equity cushion. 11 U.S.C. 8 506@)(1982). 
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terest payments in compensation for the delay of enforcing the 
creditor's foreclosure rights.158 
If farmers filing bankruptcy could afford to pay postpetition inter- 
est, they probably would not be in bankruptcy. Thus, adequate protec- 
tion requirements have posed a significant threshold requirement for 
farmers seeking chapter 11 protection. If relief from the automatic 
stay is granted for failure to provide adequate protection the farmer's 
reorganization efforts are in effect ended. The Eighth Circuit, in the 
important 1986 Ahlersl59 decision, promulgated special adequate pro- 
tection rules which gave farmers in chapter 11 relief from the ade- 
quate protection requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed its 
earlier ruling that adequate protection may include postpetition inter- 
est payrnents.160 But, the Court ruled that adequate protection pay- 
ments should not begin until the creditor could have recovered the 
collateral under state law, sold the collateral, and reinvested the pro- 
ceeds.161 In real estate foreclosures this would include preforeclosure 
notice periods, any stays, and any redemption period.162 It also stated 
that adequate protection payments regarding personal property collat- 
eral would not begin until the creditor applied for them.163 Collateral 
would be valued for adequate protection purposes when payments be- 
gan.164 Adequate protection payments would be made after farm 
products were sold rather than monthly.165 The Court also ruled that 
a lien on future crops could constitute an adequate protection pay- 
ment.166 The Court did not discuss whether an adequate protection 
payment of postpetition interest would be appropriate in a farm reor- 
ganization case. 
The Ahlers ruling which delays adequate protection payments on 
farm real estate until the creditor could have obtained the land 
through foreclosure gives the reorganizing farmer additional time to 
have his plan confirmed. Prior to Ahlers the request for relief from 
the stay and the demand of adequate protection requirement doomed 
most farm reorganizations from the beginning. If postpetition inter- 
est payments would not strain the reorganizing farmer's fragile cash 
flow, the payments for postpetition collateral value declines would. 
158. I n  r e  Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339, 1350 (8th Cir. 1985). 
159. I n  re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986), cmt. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (1987). 
160. Id. at 395, citing In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339,1350 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. 
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (1987). 
161. I n  re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 396 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 
(1987). 
162. Id. at 395-96. 
163. Id. at 396. 
164. Id. at 396-97. 
165. Id. at 397. 
166. Id., citing I n  re Martin, 761 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1985), discussed infra at notes 172- 
78. 
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Ahlers does not dismiss the adequate protection requirement, how- 
ever, and postpetition interest plus payments reflecting a loss of value 
which occurrs after the creditor would have obtained the land through 
foreclosure may be imposed on reorganizing farmer under the ade- 
quate protection rule. However, Ahlers does give reorganizing farm- 
ers in chapter 11 an additional period free of real estate adequate 
protection payments. This additional period may give the farmer suffi- 
cient time to propose a reorganization plan, which may ultimately en- 
hance the farmer's chances for a successful chapter 11 reorganization. 
Cash collateral. Prior to Ahlers few chapter 11 farm reorganiza- 
tions survived past the relief from the automatic stay-adequate protec- 
tion hearing. If they did, however, they typically would face 
additional difficulties in obtaining permission to use cash collateral to 
operate the farm pending reorganization. Cash collateral, which is de- 
fined broadly to include nearly any current asset,l67 cannot be used 
without the consent of the lienor unless the bankruptcy court autho- 
rizes its use.168 If the lienor does not consent, the court may authorize 
the cash collateral use if the lienor's interest is adequately pro- 
tected.169 Adequate protection may be provided by cash payments, pe- 
riodic cash payments, an additional or replacement lien to compensate 
the lien holder for any reductions in collateral value, or such other 
relief that will allow the secured party to realize the indubitable 
equivalent of its interest in the collateral.z70 In farm reorganizations 
the debtor typically requests permission to use the proceeds obtained 
from selling encumbered crops or livestock for operating expenses 
rather than turning the proceeds over to creditors. To meet the ade- 
quate protection requirement farm debtors will propose to give credi- 
tors a lien on next year's crop as a substitute lien. The future crop 
generally will be available for a replacement lien because any after 
acquired property interest in crops planted postpetition will be cut off 
by the automatic stay.171 
The considerations in providing adequate protection for use of cash 
collateral are somewhat different from those regarding relief from the 
automatic stay. Regarding the latter, the creditor is requesting com- 
pensation for the delay in its foreclosure rights. Regarding cash collat- 
eral, the creditor is seeking to insure that the value of its collateral is 
maintained, even though the corpus of the collateral may change. In 
167. 11 U.S.C. $ 363(a)(1982). 
168. Id. $363(c)(2). 
169. Id. 5 363(e). 
170. Id. $ 361. 
171. Id. $ 552(a). See In re Beck, 61 Bankr. 671,673 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985), citing In re 
Sheehan, 38 Bankr. 859 (D.S.D. 1984). Livestock and perennial crops, such as 
alfalfa, are however likely to be subject to any prepetition security interests. 11 
U.S.C. 552(b)(1982). See also I n  re Wobig, 73 Bankr. 292 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987), 
discussed infra notes 433-36. 
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both cases the creditor is seeking to protect its interest, but its interest 
is not the same in both cases. Adequate protection as it relates to use 
of farm cash collateral was considered by the Eight Circuit in In re 
Martin.172 In Martin the debtor farmer proposed to sell stored grain 
subject to a Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) lien, use the pro- 
ceeds to plant a new crop, and provide CCC with a substitute lien on 
the future crop.173 The farmer also proposed to assign federal crop 
insurance proceeds to the CCC.174 The Eighth Circuit ruled that in 
considering requests to use cash collateral, the bankruptcy court must 
establish the value of the secured creditor's interest, identify the risks 
to secured party's value resulting from the proposed cash collateral 
use, and determine whether the debtor's offer of adequate protection 
protects collateral value as nearly as possible against risks to value 
consistent with the concept of indubitable equivalence.175 Regarding 
use of a substitute lien on future crops, the Court indicated that the 
bankruptcy court's factual determinations should include (1) the an- 
ticipated crop yield in light of the land's productivity, (2) the farmer's 
husbandry practices, including proven crop yields from prior years, (3) 
the health and reliability of the farmer, (4) the condition of the 
farmer's machinery, (5) whether encumbrances on the machinery 
may subject it to repossession before the crop is harvested, (6) any 
competing liens on the future crop, (7) crop insurance availability and 
the likelihood of an uninsured loss, and (8) anticipated market prices 
for the crop.176 The Court indicated that the bankruptcy court should 
enjoy broad discretion in requiring modification of the proposed ade- 
quate protection to protect creditors's interests, and should reject the 
offer of adequate protection if creditors's interests are not adequately 
protected thereby.177 
Cash collateral disputes are unlikely to hinder a farm reorganiza- 
tion if the farmer is able to offer adequate protection to creditors with 
replacement liens on cash collateral. Where the farmer is unable to 
- - - - - - 
172. In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1985). 
173. Regarding the CCC, see Comment, The Commodity Credit Corporation's Price 
Support Loan Program: Should It Continue?, 31 S.D.L.REV. 350 (1986). 
174. Regarding federal crop insurance, see 7 U.S.C. 9 1508(a) (1982); 1 DAVIDSON, AG 
RICULTURAL LAW 5 1.31 (1981 & CUm.Supp. 1986). 
175. In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472, 476-77 (8th Cir. 1985). 
176. Id. at 477. The market price criterion would also involve a consideration of possi- 
ble or likely changes in farm programs. See generally Comment, s u m  note 173; 
Comment, Federal Direct Price Support Payment Programs, 31 S.D.L.REV. 363 
(1986). Normally cash grain farmers can predict next year's price with a high 
degree of certainty if they participate in the federal farm program. Only the fu- 
ture yield would be unknown. See In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 408-10 (8th Cir. 
1986), cwt. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (1987). 
177. In re Martin, 761 F.2d. 472,477-78 (8th Cir. 1985). The Court also suggested that 
CCC would be entitled to interest payments if the farmer's repayment of its CCC 
loan were delayed through the use of cash collateral. Id. at 477. 
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provide cash collateral, of course, the reorganization attempt is 
doomed. In some cases the expense and perhaps more significantly 
the delays occasioned by cash collateral litigation may be sufficient to 
frustrate the farm debtor's reorganization attempt.17" 
Absolute priority rule. If the farm debtor can survive the adequate 
protection challenges and cash collateral disputes, he then can propose 
a reorganization plan. If an undersecured creditor objects to the plan, 
however, the absolute priority rule will in virtually every case prevent 
plan confirmation, even as a cramdown. Under the absolute priority 
rule if any impaired class rejects the plan, the class must be paid in 
full before any junior class (including equity holders, e.g. the reorga- 
nizing farmer) can receive anything, even in a cramdown.l79 Thus, 
since in most farm reorganization cases there are no or insufficient 
unencumbered assets available to satisfy unsecured claims for defi- 
ciencies, the farmer could not retain an equity interest in the farm 
unless all dissenting classes were paid in full. The absolute priority 
rule amounts to an absolute bar to confirmation, in farm reorganiza- 
tions and in virtually all noncorporate reorganizations, if the plan is 
not accepted by creditors.ls0 As a result, courts have fashioned excep- 
tions to the absolute priority rule which allow shareholders to retain 
an equity interests in the reorganized business, even if dissenting un- 
secured claims were not paid in full, to the extent that the sharehold- 
ers contributed new value essential to a successful reorganization as 
part of the reorganization plan.181 In Ahlws, the Eight Circuit ex- 
tended this fresh contribution exception to farm reorganizations 
where the farmer contributes his labor and management to the reor- 
ganization effort.182 
In Ahlers undersecured creditors argued that the debtor could not 
propose a confirmable plan because the creditors intended to vote 
against any plan that would not pay unsecured claims in full, prevent- 
ing cramdown confirmation under the absolute priority rule.183 How- 
178. An issue in Martin was whether the appeal was mooted by the passage of time, 
i.e. planting had already occurred when the appeal was held. The Court of Ap- 
peals held that the issue was not moot, but instructed the bankruptcy court to 
reconsider the cash collateral issue only if the debtor stilI needed to use the cash 
collateral, i.e. had not made other financial arrangements. Id. at 474, 478-79. 
179. 11 U.S.C. 8 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)(1982). 
180. This feature of the absolute priority rule has been criticized as being appropriate 
only to corporate reorganizations where shareholders and managers are distinct 
groups. Comment, I n  re A h h  l3.e Farm Reorganization Exception to the Abso- 
lute Priority Rule, 32 S.D.L.REV. 167, 172-74(1987). 
181. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); In re Landau Boat 
Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); I n  re Marston Enterprises, Inc., 13 
Bankr. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). See Comment, supra note 180 at 17475. 
182. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388,402403 (8th Cir. 1986), cert grunted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 
(1987). 
183. Id. at 399-401. 
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ever, the Court, after reviewing the fresh contribution exception 
cases, concluded that the absolute priority rule was subject to a fresh 
contribution exception where the debtor "contributes to the reorgani- 
zation enterprise something that is reasonably compensatory and is 
measurable."l84 The Court then asserted that "a farmer's efforts in 
operating and managing his farm is essential to any successful farm 
reorganization, and that such yearly contribution is measurable in 
money or money's worth."ls5 The Court suggested that in determin- 
ing the value of the farmer's contributions, it would not be difficult to 
value the farmer's labor, experience and expertise. But, it concluded 
that valuing the retained ownership interest would be more diffi- 
cult.186 The Court suggested, however, that no ownership equity 
would mature until the plan had been completed and all secured 
claims paid.187 To protect unsecured claimants the Court suggested 
that any income in excess of that anticipated by the reorganization 
plan should be paid to unsecured claimants on a prorata basis up to 
full payment without interest.188 
One factor noted by the Eighth Circuit but not formally incorpo- 
rated into its ruling was that Ahlers proposed to pay the unsecured 
claims in full without interest, as opposed to no recovery if the farm 
were liquidated.189 The Court noted that Ahlers had excellent pros- 
pects for rehabilitation in that if his debt was restructured to reflect 
current asset values he could pay all secured claims and "make sub- 
stantial payments to unsecured creditors."lgO Nowhere in its opinion 
does the Court suggest that its ruling is contingent upon the creditor 
making substantial payments to unsecured creditors. Yet one won- 
184. Id. at 402. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 403. One commentator has suggested that the cost of farm management 
services could be used to value the farmer's labor and management contribution, 
and that a capitalized earnings test could be used to calculate ownership equity. 
Comment, supra note 180, at 177-78. 
187. I n  re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 403 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 
(1987). 
188. Id. at 403. The Court also suggested that if any encumbered property were sold 
during the period of the plan, any surplus should be distributed to unsecured 
claim holders. Id. 
189. Id. at 413. This outcome was dependent on Ahlers being able to achieve their 
projected farm income, which includes future crop yields and crop prices, both of 
which are uncertain. In addition, because the farm price supports are scheduled 
to decrease from from 1985 to 1990, and because further price support reductions 
may result from Gramm-Rudman-Hollings or other deficit reduction measures, 
both suggest that Ahlers projected farm income should be reduced to accommo- 
date these expectations. See Comment, Food Security Act of 1985: Price Suppwt 
Programs, 31 S.D.L.REV. 490 (1986); Comment, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and 
the Famz Bill: Solution or Suicide Pact?, 31 S.D.L.REV. 541 (1986). 
190. I n  re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 338, 399 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 
(1987). 
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ders if the outcome would have been the same if unsecured creditors 
would have received little or no payment. Implicit in the Court's anal- 
ysis is the assumption that the unsecured creditors were substantially 
better off with the plan than they would be in liquidation.191 If this 
suggestion is correct, the Ahlers fresh contribution exception is implic- 
itly subject to the limitation that unsecured claimants must receive 
significantly more than the liquidated value of their claim (which 
often is nothing). In a case where unsecured claimants would receive 
little more than the liquidated value of their claim under the proposed 
reorganization plan there would seem to be little economic benefit 
(generally or to creditors) from approving the reorganization, and 
therefore, no reason for invoking the fresh contribution exception to 
the absolute priority rule. 
Prior to Ahlers the absolute priority rule constituted a near abso- 
lute barrier to farm chapter 11 reorganizations. To the extent that 
Ahlers creates a fresh contribution exception to the absolute priority 
rule for farm reorganizations, it provides farm debtors with the possi- 
bility of a successful chapter 11 farm reorganization. The debtor may 
be required to demonstrate, however, that unsecured claimants will 
significantly benefit from the reorganization relative to liquidation. 
In the absence of such a showing, the justification for allowing a fresh 
contribution exception might fail. 
C. Chapter 13 Debt Adjustments.lg2 
Chapter 13 differs markedly from chapter 11. Based on wage 
earner bankruptcies under former bankruptcy law, the goal of chapter 
13 is confirmation of a debt adjustment plan rather than negotiation 
and creditor acceptance of the plan.193 Chapter 13 is intended by Con- 
gress to provide an inexpensive alternative for consumers to chapter 7 
liquidation which gives at least partial payment to unsecured creditors 
who would otherwise generally receive nothing in chapter 7. While 
creditors may seek relief from the automatic stay, the short time pe- 
riod of chapter 13 proceedings effectively makes seeking each relief a 
moot effort.194 There is no absolute priority rule, and the debt adjust- 
ment plan may be "crammed down" objecting secured claim holders. 
If unsecured claim holders object to the plan then they are entitled to 
share any of the debtor's disposable income during the life of the plan. 
A chapter 13 debtor is eligible for a broader "super discharge" similar 
to a chapter 7 or 11 discharge. Congress drew heavily on chapter 13 in 
drafting chapter 12. 
- - 
191. Id. at  402-03. 
192. See generally R. AARON, supra note 19, $ 13; Dole, supra note 98. 
193. See R. AARON, supra note 19, § 13.01[1] a t  13-14. 
194. 11 U.S.C. 1301 (1982). Debt collection against codebtors on consumer debts is also 
stayed. Id. 
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Eligibility. Chapter 13 is voluntary only.195 Eligibility is limited to 
individuals, sole proprietorships, and married couples filing jointly 
with no more than $350,000 of secured debt and $100,000 of unsecured 
debt, which would exclude most commercial farmers.196 Business 
debtors are eligible for chapter 13 if they are neither incorporated nor 
a partnership.197 Farm couples who own and operate property jointly 
are not automatically considered partners, and may be eligible for 
chapter 13.198 The filing fee is $90.199 The debtor must have suffi- 
ciently stable and regular income to make the proposed payments.200 
Farmers have been held to have an income sufficiently stable and reg- 
ular to qualify for chapter 13.201 A case may be converted from chap- 
ter 7 or 11 to chapter 13 only by the debtor.202 The debtor may convert 
a chapter 13 case to chapter 7 or 11, or dismiss the case.203 A chapter 
13 case may be converted to chapter 7 or 11 at creditors's request but 
not against a farmer.204 
Case adminis trat ion .  The debtor remains in possession of his prop- 
erty during the proceeding: there is no separate bankruptcy estate.205 
The chapter 13 plan must be filed within 15 days of the petition,206 
which may be one reason many farm bankruptcy attorneys have opted 
for chapter I1 rather than chapter 13. The plan or summary is sent to 
creditors as part of the notice for the confirmation hearing, which 
must be held within 25 days of the notice.207 This will be approxi- 
mately at the same time as the first meeting of creditors, which must 
be held within 20-40 days after filing the bankruptcy petition.208 Plan 
payments must begin within 30 days of the petition unless the bank- 
ruptcy court orders otherwise, even if the plan has not been con- 
195. Id. $ 303(a). Attempts have failed to authorize involuntary chapter 13 cases to 
avoid abuse of chapter 7 liquidations. See R. AARON, supra note 19, $ 13.01[1], at 
13-3. 
196. 11 U.S.C. 109(e) (1982). 
197. Id. 4 lOl(29). 
198. See In r e  Hansen, 60 Bankr. 359 (l3ankr.D. Neb. 1982), appeal dismissed, 702 F.2d 
728 (8th Cir. 1983) cert. denied 463 U.S. 1208 (1983); Ogallala Fertilizer Co. v. Sal- 
sbery, 186 Neb. 537, 184 N.W.2d 729 (1971); Dole, supra note 98, at 446-47. 
199. 28 U.S.C.A. 4 1930 (West Supp. 1987). A financially distressed debtor may pay the 
fee in up to four installments over up to 180 days. Fed. Bankr. R. 1006(b). The 
debtor's attorney may not be paid until the filing fee has been paid. Id. 
1006(b)(3). 
200. 11 U.S.C. $ lOl(18). 
201. See Dole, supra note 98, at 447-48. 
202. 11 U.S.C. $$ 706, 1112(d) (1982). 
203. Id. $ 1307(a),(b),(d). 
204. Id. 3 1307(c),(d),(e), 303(a). For the bankruptcy definition of a "farmer", seesupra 
text a t  note 24. 
205. Id. $ 1306(b). 
206. Id. 3015. 
207. Id. 2002(b). 
208. Fed. Bankr. R. 2003(a). 
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firmed.209 Creditors are subject to the automatic stay, although there 
is an additional stay for codebtors on consumer debt.210 Creditors 
may apply for relief from the automatic stay, and cash collateral rules 
apply in chapter 13 proceedings in the same fashion as in chapter 11. 
The major difference is that chapter 13 proceedings are so short rela- 
tive to chapter 11 proceedings that adequate protection issues will not 
loom as large as they do in chapter 11 proceedings.211 There is some 
dispute regarding whether chapter 13 debtors may claim property ex- 
emptions (as they retain all property) or may exercise lien avoidance 
powers.212 
Chapter 13pZan. The plan must be filed with the petition or 15 days 
thereafter.213 The debtor typically will classify creditors as secured 
(with each creditor normally being a separate class), priority, and un- 
secured.214 Some cases have approved a special category for un- 
secured creditors essential to the debtor's future operation and have 
proposed that the plan pay such creditors more than other unsecured 
creditors.215 The plan may modify the rights of secured or unsecured 
claim holders,216 and provide for the curing or waiving of any de- 
fault.217 Plans may be three to five years long,218 and secured claims 
may be paid over a longer period.219 Unsecured claim holders do not 
vote on the plan, although they may object to confirmation.220 Se- 
cured claim holders may reject the treatment of their claim in the 
plan.221 
Confirnation standards. Any creditor may object to confirma- 
tion.222 TO be confirmed the chapter 13 plan must provide that 
enough of the debtor's income will be given to the trustee to make 
payments under the plan,223 that all priority claims will be paid in full 
209. 11 U.S.C. 8 1326(a) (Supp.111 1985). 
210. Id. $1301. 
211. See R. AARON, supra note 19, 4 13.02[3] at 13-18. 
212. Id. $ 13.02[4]-[5]. 
213. Fed. Bankr. R. 3015. , 
214. 11 U.S.C. $1322(a)(3)(1982). 
215. See Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1945); I n  re Realty Assocs. Sec. Corp., 
53 F.Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); Amfac Dist. Corp. v. Wolff., 22 Bankr. 510 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
216. 11 U.S.C. 9 1322(b)(2) (1982). However a residential mortgage cannot be modi- 
fied. Id. 
217. Id. 5 1322(b)(3),(5). 
218. Id. $ 1322(c). 
219. Id. $5 1322(b)(2),(3),(5), 1328(a)(1). 
220. Id. 1325(b)(l) (Supp.111 1985). 
221. Id. $1325(a)(5)(A) (1982). 
222. Id. $1324. 
223. Id. $ 1325(a)(l), 1322(a)(l). The court may order any entity from which the 
debtor receives income to pay any or all of the income directly to the chapter 13 
trustee. Id. $ 1325(c) (Supp.111 1985). 
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unless the claim holder accepts different treatment,224 that the same 
treatment will be provided for all claims within a particular class,225 
that at least the liquidated value of all unsecured claims will be 
paid,226 that the plan is proposed in good faith,227 and that the plan is 
feasible.228 A secured claim holder may accept the plan, thereby con- 
senting to whatever treatment of its claim was proposed therein.229 If 
a secured claim holder rejects the plan it must either retain its lien 
under the plan and receive the liquidated value of its claim,230 or re- 
ceive the collateral.231 If the trustee or an unsecured claim holder ob- 
jects to confirmation, the objecting unsecured claim holder must 
either be repaid in full or else the debtor must commit all disposal 
income to plan payments.232 
Implementing the plan. The debtor must provide enough of his 
income to the trustee who will then make payments to creditors.233 In 
chapter 13 cases the fees for a standing or U.S. trustee is up to 5% of 
all payments made under the plan.234 
Chapter 13 debt discharge. The scope of the chapter 13 debt dis- 
charge is much broader than chapter 7 debt discharge. The only debts 
that are not discharged are debts for alimony, child support, and long 
term debt.235 Priority claims (including priority tax claims) can be 
discharged, as can secured claims paid within the period of the plan. 
In addition, a chapter 13 debtor's super discharge could include dis- 
charge from a debt resulting from a forged check,236 conversion of col- 
lateral,237 or the obtaining of loans under false pretenses.238 The 
justification for this super discharge is to encourage debtors to elect 
chapter 13 bankruptcy rather than chapter 7 liquidation.239 Dis- 
charge occurs when the debtor has made all payments under the 
224. Id. $5 1325(a)(l), 1322(a)(2)(1982). 
225. Id. $9 1325(a)(l), 1322(a)(3). 
226. Id. $ 1325(a)(4). 
227. Id. $ 1325(a)(3). 
228. Id. $ 1325(a)(6). 
229. Id. $ 1325(a)(5)(A). 
230. Id. $ 1325(a)(5)(B). 
231. Id. $ 1325(a)(5)(C). 
232. Id. $ 1325(b)(l)(Supp. I11 1985). Disposal income is income not required or main- 
tenance or support of the debtor and his family. Id. $ 1325(b)(2)(A). For a busi- 
ness debtor disposal income also includes income not required for the 
continuation, preservation and operation of the debtor's business. Id. 
$ 1325(b)(2)(B). 
233. Id. $ 1326(c). 
234. Id. 5 1326(b). 
235. Id. $1328(a) (1982). 
236. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Keckler, 3 Bankr. 155 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). 
237. Overland Park Dodge, Inc. v. Graff, 7 Bankr. 426 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980). 
238. I n  re Marlow, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 705 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980). 
239. See R. AARON, supra note 19, § 13.01[1], at 13-2. 
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plan.240 The chapter 13 debtor may also be able to qualify for a "hard- 
ship discharge," The bankruptcy judge may discharge the debtor from 
any remaining liability under the plan if (1) the debtor has made a 
good faith effort to implement the plan but cannot do so for circum- 
stances beyond the debtor's control, (2) the plan could not be imple- 
mented even if modified, and (3) unsecured claim holders had received 
the liquidated value of their claims.24l The debtor would still be lia- 
ble only for debts consisting of alimony, child support, and long term 
debt.242 An earlier chapter 13 discharge does not bar a subsequent 
chapter 7 discharge within six years if the debtor paid 100% of the 
unsecured claims, or the debtor paid 70% of the unsecured claims, the 
plan was proposed in good faith and was the debtor's best effort.243 
Chapter 13 has many advantages for farm debtors if they can meet 
the debt and entity limitations. The absence of the absolute priority 
rule is a significant advantage, as is the super discharge. The possible 
ability to separately classify unsecured creditors essential to future op- 
erations and give them favored repayment terms is another sigmficant 
advantage. The debt and entity limitations of chapter 13, however, 
preclude most commercial farmers from utilizing these advantages. 
To those farmers who can qualify under the chapter 13 debt ceiling 
and entity requirements, chapter 13 is an attractive reorganization 
alternative.244 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 
Until the Ahlers decision was handed down in 1986 farmers had no 
realistic chance of reorganizing in chapter 11 bankruptcy. Adequate 
protection requirements, particularly postpetition interest, led to cred- 
itors obtaining relief from the automatic stay, resulting in loss of the 
farmer's land and dooming any reorganization attempt. If a farmer 
could survive the relief from the automatic stay, the absolute priority 
rule virtually insured that farmers could not propose a confirmable 
reorganization plan, leaving farmers vulnerable to creditor's liquidat- 
ing plans. Chapter 13 provided an attractive farm reorganization al- 
ternative, but was not available to corporations, partnerships, or 
farmers with debts exceeding the relatively modest debt limitations. 
In addition the chapter 13 plan had to be submitted within 15 days, a 
requirement many otherwise qualified farmers found difficult to 
240. 11 U.S.C. 8 1328(a)(1982). 
241. Id. 3 1328(b). 
242. Id. 5 1328(c). 
243. Id. 4 727(a)(9). 
244. A South Dakota State University study indicated that 22% of the farmers filing 
for chapter 11 could have qualified for chapter 13. JANSSEN & SC~IESING,  DEP'T 
OF ECONOI\.IICS, UNIV. OF SOUTH DAKOTA, REFT. NO. 87-6 EXAMINATION F FARM 
B A N K R U ~ C Y  DEBTORS AND THEIR CREDITORS (1987). 
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meet. Thus, most farmers had no effective bankruptcy reorganization 
alternative. 
In response to these problems, farm bankruptcy bills were intro- 
duced in Congress in 1985 which resulted in the Bankruptcy Judges, 
United States Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act of 1986. 
Family farmer bankruptcy legislation was first enacted in the House 
in 1985. The House bill allowed those qualifying as family farmers to 
reorganize in chapter 13 if their total debt did not exceed $1 million. 
The Senate instead established a new family farmer bankruptcy chap- 
ter as chapter 12 in its bill. The Senate version ultimately was adopted 
by the Conference Committee and was signed by President Reagan on 
October 27, 1986.245 
H.R. 1397 and 1399 were introduced in the House of Representa- 
tives on March 5, 1985. Both bills modified chapter 13 proceedings 
and to a lesser extent modified chapter 11 proceedings for those who 
qualified as family farmers. H.R. 1397, introduced by Representative 
Rodino, would have defined family farmer as a person receiving at 
least 75% of his gross income for the preceding year from farming.246 
Incorporated family farms would have qualified for family farmer 
bankruptcy treatment if 90% of the stock was owned by the farm fam- 
ily and the stock was not publicly traded247 Those qualifying as fam- 
ily farmers could file for chapter 13 bankruptcy if they had regular 
annual income and their total debt did not exceed $1 million.248 Fam- 
ily farmer debtors would have been given up to seven years to com- 
plete a chapter 13 reorganization plan,249 which would offer greater 
repayment of unsecured claims. In a family farmer chapter 13 case 
the bankruptcy judge would have been authorized to allow repay- 
ments to begin within a reasonable time after the plan were filled 
rather than the standard 30 days.250 This would reflect the fact that 
most farmers receive their income on a yearly basis.251 H.R. 1397 also 
would have modified chapter 11 reorganizations for family farmers. 
The exclusive period for the debtor's filing a chapter 11 reorganization 
plan would have been extended for farmers from 180 days to 240 days, 
while the exclusive period for the debtor to obtain plan approval 
245. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act 
of 1986, Pub.L., 99-554 $225,100 Stat. 3088, 3105 (codified as  amended at 11 U.S.C. $9 1201-1231). For a brief legislative history of chapter 12 see J. ANDERSON & J. 
MORRIS, supra note 6, at 5 1.23. 
246. H.R. 1397 sec. l(b), 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985). 
247. Id. 5 l(b). 
248. Id. 3 2. 
249. Id. § 4. 
250. Id. 5. 
251. This would be true for most cash grain farmers with a single cropping season, as 
would generally be the case in the plains and midwest. Dairy farmers market 
their products weekly, however, and many livestock producers market their pro- 
duction several times a year. 
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would have been extended for farmers from 180 days to 300 days.252 
Finally, H.R. 1397 would have reduced the farm income requirement 
from 80% to 75% regarding which farmers were protected from invol- 
untary bankruptcy liquidations.253 In his introductory statement Rep- 
resentative Rodino commented on the poor farm economy, the 
inability of farmers to have a chapter 11 plan approved, the inability of 
most family farmers to qualify for chapter 13 protection, the vulnera- 
bility of chapter 11 farm debtors to creditor's liquidating plans, and the 
likelihood that most farmers seeking to reorganize in bankruptcy 
would likely end up in liquidation.254 
H.R. 1399, the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1985, in- 
troduced by Representative Synar, was similar in most respects to 
H.R. 1397, except that it dealt exclusively with chapter 13. To qualify 
as a family farmer for chapter 13, a person would have had to receive 
more than 50% of his gross income from farming.255 An incorporated 
family farm could qualify as such if the majority of the shares was 
owned by the farm family (including relatives) and the stock was not 
publicly traded.256 Family farmers would have been eligible for chap- 
ter 13 if their debts did not exceed $1 million.257 Family farmers 
would have had up to ten years to complete their chapter 13 reorgani- 
zation plan.258 The chapter 13 cramdown provision would have re- 
quired (1) the secured claimant to retain the lien and receive the 
liquidated value of its claim, (2) the lien to attach to sale proceeds if 
the collateral was sold, or (3) the secured claimant to realize the indu- 
bitable equivalent of its claim,259 similar to chapter 11. Family farmer 
payments on a chapter 13 plan would have been required to begin 
within 270 days after the plan was filed, rather than the standard 30 
days.260 In his introductory comments Representative Synar stated 
that the purpose of his bill was "to give family farmers facing bank- 
ruptcy a fighting chance to reorganize their debts and keep their land. 
The bill offers family farmers the important protection from creditors 
that bankruptcy provides while, at the same time, ensuring that farm 
lenders-rural banks, the Farmers Home Administration, farm imple- 
ment dealers, seed companies and others-receive a fair repay- 
-- - - 
252. H.R. 1397 3 3, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985). 
253. Id. 3 l(a). The biII would not have applied to existing bankruptcy cases. Id. sec. 7. 
254. 131 CONG.REC. 778-79 (daily ed. March 5, 1985). 
255. H.R. 1399 4 2, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985). 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 8 3. Residential mortgages on family farms would have been excluded from 
the section 1322 requirement that residential mortgages not be modified in chap- 
ter 13. Id. $4(b). 
258. Id. 8 4(c). 
259. Id. § 4(d)(5). 
260. Id. 4(e). See supra note 251. The bill would not have applied to existing bank- 
ruptcy cases. Id. § 6. 
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ment."26l Representative Synar commented at length on the 
economic difficulties farmers were facing as a result of the poor farm 
economy and the legal difficulties farmers encountered in attempting 
to have a chapter 11 reorganization plan confirmed, particularly their 
vulnerability to creditor's liquidating plans.262 
The two bills were combined into a new bill, H.R. 2211, introduced 
by Representatives Rodino, Synar, and others on April 24,1985. H.R. 
2211 as introduced would have affected farm reorganizations in chap- 
ters 11 and 13. The minimum percentage farm income test in the fam- 
ily farmer definition was dropped in favor of a farm debt 
requirement: at least 80% of the farmer's debt would have had to be 
related to the farming operation.263 Family farmers would have been 
eligible for chapter 13 if they had regular annual income and their 
debts did not exceed $1 million.264 A chapter 13 trustee's fees in fam- 
ily farmer cases would have been limited to up to 10% of the first 
$450,000 in plan payments, and up to 3% thereafter.265 Farm mort- 
gages including the farmstead mortgage could have been rewritten, 
and family farmer chapter 13 plans could not extend beyond seven 
years.266 Payments on a family farmer chapter 13 plan could, in the 
court's discretion, have begun later than usual 30 days after the plan 
was filed.267 The exclusive period in which the debtor may file a chap- 
ter 11 reorganization plan would have been extended for farmers from 
180 days to 240 days, while the exclusive period for the debtor to ob- 
tain plan approval would have been extended for farmers from 180 
days to 300 days.268 Family farmers would also have been exempt 
from involuntary bankruptcies.269 
The combined bill was reported out of the Judiciary Committee on 
June 20, 1985 with few changes. The committee report added a re- 
quirement for incorporated family farms which stated that at least 
half the stock be held by the farm family and that the stock not be 
261. 131 CONG.REC. E777 (daily ed. Mar 5, 1985)(statement of Rep. Synar). 
262. Id. Rep. Synar also mistakenly asserted that only one percent of all operating 
farmers were immune from involuntary bankruptcy, citing an unnamed U.S. De- 
partment of Agriculture study concluding that only the top 1% of agricultural 
producers earned more than 70% of their income from farming. Id. Apparently 
the U.S.D.A. report referred to farmers's net income, whereas the involuntary 
bankruptcy protection test is a gross income test, not a net income test. Cf. 11 
U.S.C. 5 303(a). If section 303(a) were a net income test Rep. Synar would have 
been correct in asserting that only few farmers would qualify for immunity from 
involuntary bankruptcies. 
263. H.R. 2211, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. $1 (1985). 
264. Id. $ 2(2). 
265. Id. $ 5(a). 
266. Id. 3 7(b). 
267. Id. 8. 
268. Id. $ 4(a). 
269. Id. $ 3. The bill would not have applied to existing bankruptcy cases. Id. at 5 10. 
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publicly traded.270 The maximum period of time for a family farmer 
chapter 13 plan was changed from seven to ten years to allow for 
greater repayment of unsecured claims.271 In the floor debate Repre- 
sentative Williams recounted how farmers who had been encouraged 
by federal agricultural officials and farm lenders to expand their op- 
erations during the 1960s and 1970s were now facing financial ruin be- 
cause they had followed such advice, and then encountered low crop 
prices, high interest rates, and falling land values.272 Representative 
Synar acknowledged that the bill would not solve the farm crisis, and 
would only help those family farmers with sufficient financial vitality 
able to successfully reorganize under the new bankruptcy provi- 
sions.273 Representative Spar also suggested that the bill would ben- 
efit farm lenders as they would receive more under a successful 
reorganization than they would under liquidation.274 Representative 
Moorhead quoted hearings testimony to the effect that a longer period 
for family farmer chapter 13 plans would increase repayment of un- 
secured creditors,275 while the longer period for filing a family farm 
chapter 11 plan would allow debtors to more accurately evaluate the 
results of the next harvest.276 The committee bill was passed by the 
House on June 24, 1985.277 
H.R. 2211 would have provided substantial bankruptcy relief to 
family farmers. The absence of the chapter 11 elements styming farm 
reorganizations-the adequate protection requirement, creditor ap- 
proval of the farm reorganization plan, and the absolute priority 
rule-would have significantly enhanced the possibility of a successful 
farm reorganization. At the same time, the extended ten year period 
for a family farmer chapter 13 reorganization plan would have in- 
creased the eventual recovery of unsecured claimants to the extent 
farmers realized disposable income, balancing somewhat the signifi- 
cant advantages afforded to family farmers at the expense of their 
creditors. However, the possibility of the chapter 13 family farmer 
debtor receiving either a hardship discharge or a super discharge sug- 
gested that creditors would have run the significant risk of not receiv- 
ing the liquidated value of their claims, let alone any additional 
270. H.R. Rep. No. 178 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in June 18.l(a) Bankr. L. Rep. 
CCCH No. 152 (June 27,1985). 
271. Id. 9 7(b). See, 131 CONG.REC. H4770 (daily ed. June 24,1985) (statement of Rep. 
Moorhead). 
272. 131 CONG. REC. H4774-75 (daily ed. June 24, 1985) (Statement of Rep. Williams). 
273. Id. at H4769. 
274. Id. at H4470. Presumably this assertion took into account the expanded payments 
to unsecured claimants that would occur with a ten year family farmer chapter 13 
plan. 
275. Id. One bankruptcy judge suggested that higher repayment of unsecured debts 
would allow family farmers to retain more dignity and self respect. Id. 
276. Id. at H4771. 
277. Id. at H4775. 
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repayment. Therefore, despite the ten year term of the family farmer 
chapter 13 plan, creditors would have run a substantial risk of receiv- 
ing less then they would have in immediate liquidation. 
In the Senate, Senator Grassley introduced S. 2249, the Family 
Farm Reorganization Act of 1986, on March 26, 1986.278 The bill pro- 
posed a new chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code which combined ele- 
ments of chapter 11 and chapter 13. Family farmer eligibility 
requirements were similar to those of H.R. 2211 except that the debt 
ceiling was increased from $1 million to $1.5 million.279 A trustee 
would be appointed for all chapter 12 cases similar to chapter 13.280 
The farm debtor would operate the farm as a debtor in possession with 
authorities similar to a chapter 11 debtor in possession.2~~ A creditor's 
committee would have been established similar to chapter 11 with 
similar authorities.282 The debtor in possession would have been re- 
moved on the same general bases as a chapter 11 debtor in posses- 
sion.283 The chapter 12 debtor would have had an exclusive right to 
file a reorganization plan within 240 days after filing, with an addi- 
tional 60 days to have the plan approved by creditors.284 The proposed 
confirmation standard was similar to chapter 11.285 The bill's chapter 
12 adequate protection requirements were significantly different from 
those of chapter 11. Section 361, including the indubitable equivalent 
requirement, would not have applied in the proposed chapter 12. In- 
stead, reasonable customw rental payments would have been re- 
quired for use of farmland, in addition to the chapter 11 periodic cash 
payments, replacement liens, and other relief.286 Farmland or farm 
equipment could have been sold by the trustee free of creditors's inter- 
ests.287 A special provision would have allowed obtaining credit on an 
expedited basis to provide emergency livestock care.288 The new chap- 
ter 12 would have had a five year life.289 In his introductory remarks 
- -- -- - - - - -- 
278. Cosponsors included the late Sen. Zorinsky of Nebraska. Other Senate farm 
bankruptcy proposals included S. 1342, and S. 1516. See 132 CONG.REC. 55556 
(daily ed. May 7, 1986). 
279. S. 2249 99th Cong., 2d Sess. $ 2  (1986) (proposed 8 1201). 
280. Id. (proposed 9 1203). 
281. Id. (proposed $8 1204, 1205). 
282. Id. (proposed $$ 1206, 1207). 
283. Id. (proposed 3 1209). 
284. Id. (proposed $1211). Creditors could have filed a plan if the debtor were re- 
moved as debtor in possession, if the debtor in possession did not file a plan 
within 240 days, or did not have the plan approved by creditors. Id. The contents 
of the debtor's plan would have been similar to those of a chapter 11 plan. Id. 
(proposed $1211). A disclosure statement, creditor solicitation, and creditor vot- 
ing would have been required similar to chapter 11. Id. (proposed § 1212). 
285. Id. (proposed $5 1216-18). 
286. Id. (proposed $1222). 
287. Id. (proposed $8 1223). 
288. Id. (proposed $ 1225). 
289. Id. $ 6. 
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Senator Grassley noted that the bill would eliminate the need for 
farmers to provide creditors with lost opportunity cost, and that the 
farmland adequate protection requirements reflected what creditors 
would realistically have received if they had foreclosed on the farm- 
land.290 Senator Grassley also acknowledged that the proposed chap- 
ter 12 would not solve the farm crisis, but stated that the current 
bankruptcy statutes inhibited farmer reorganizations. 
S. 2249 was subsequently added as an amendment to S. 1923, a bill 
to increase the number of bankruptcy judgeships.291 In proposing the 
amendment Senator Grassley noted that the proposed chapter 12 
would have four significant differences relative to chapter 11: modified 
adequate protection requirements, authorized sales free of liens, elimi- 
nation of the absolute priority rule, and extention of the time for filing 
a debtor's plan of reorganization.292 The Senate adopted an amend- 
ment offered by Senator McConnell which added a 50% farm income 
requirement for family farmers.293 Senator Grassley noted a change 
he made to his amendment from its original introduction which would 
require chapter 12 debtors to make periodic reports during the period 
the debtor in possession is preparing his reorganization plan.294 Sena- 
tor Helms voiced the only opposition to the new chapter 12 in the rec- 
ord of the legislative debate, stating that it would result in reduced 
credit to farmers.295 Senator Harkin voiced support for chapter 12, 
but expressed concerns regarding the five year sunset provision and 
the chapter 12 creditor's committee.296 
The Conference Committee adopted the Senate version with modi- 
fications.297 The creditor's committee provisions were deleted, the pe- 
riod for filing a chapter 12 reorganization plan was reduced from 240 
to 90 days, the confirmation hearing was required to be held within 45 
days of plan submission, and the sunset provision was increased from 
five to seven years. The Conferees stated that the purpose of the bill 
was "to give family farmers facing bankruptcy a fighting chance to 
reorganize their debts and keep their land. The bill offers family 
farmers the important protection that bankruptcy provides while, at 
the same time, preventing abuse of the system and ensuring that farm 
- - 
290. 132 CONG.REC. 53529 (daily ed. Mar 26, 1986)(Statement of Sen. Grassley). Sen. 
Grassley argued that if the lender had foredosed on the land it would have bid 
the debt at  the foreclosure sale, obtained the land, probably would not have been 
able to sell the land, and thus could only rent it. 
291. Id. at  S5619 (daily ed. May 8, 1986). 
292. Id. at S5555-56 (daily ed. May 7 1986)(Statement of Sen. Grassley). An analysis of 
the amendment is contained at  id. at S5556-58. 
293. Id. a t  S5613-15 (daily ed. May 8, 1986). 
294. Id. at S5614 (Statement of Sen. Grassley). 
295. Id. at S5618 (Statement of Sen. Helms). 
296. Id. at 55618-19 (Statement of Sen Harkin). 
297. See Conference Report of H.R. 5316, 132 CONG.REC. H8986, H8991-94 (daily ed. 
Oct. 2, 1986). 
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lenders receive fair repayment."298 The Conference Report Joint Ex- 
planatory Statement stated that farmers had found chapter 11 reorga- 
nizations unworkable, and that farmer reorganizations would be 
easier to accomplish under chapter 12.299 The Joint Explanatory 
Statement stated that there was intended to be no routine conversion 
of chapter 11 or 13 cases to chapter 12, but that bankruptcy courts 
would in their discretion authorize such conversions on a case by case 
basis. It was stated that in making that determination the court should 
consider the likelihood of a successful chapter 12 reorganization.300 
The Joint Explanatory Statement also noted the substantial changes 
in adequate protection requirements. 
In the House debate on the Conference Report Representative 
Synar stated that the new chapter 12 would give farmers the same 
opportunity to reorganize in bankruptcy that individuals and small 
businesses already had. This would benefit creditors, who would re- 
cover more than they would in liquidation, while other farmers who 
would be protected from a further decline in land values resulting 
from additional foreclosures.3Ol In the Senate Senator Thurmond 
stated that chapter 12 is intended to help those farmers with true po- 
tential to reorganize and yet allow such farmers to make reasonable 
payments to creditors given the current agricultural situation. The 
conferees intended chapter 12 to maintain a balance between farm 
debtors and creditors. Senator Thurmond warned that bankruptcy 
courts should strive to maintain equity between debtors and creditors, 
realizing the possible harm to creditors of providing financial relief to 
farmers. Senator Thurmond also stated that Congress should move 
quickly to correct serious problems in chapter 12 if they developed, 
including a possible repeal before the seven year sunset.302 A letter 
from the American Banking Association stated that the Association 
withdrew its objections to the chapter 12 because of the additional 
bankruptcy judges the bill would authorize, the 90 day requirement 
for filing a reorganization plan, the seven year sunset provision, and 
the assurance that any major inequities would be addressed in the fol- 
lowing Congress.303 Senator Grassley's statement focused on the 
298. Id. at H8999. Cf. Rep. Synar's statement supra note 263. 
299. Id. at H8998-99. 
300. Id. at H8999. Other considerations favoring conversion included whether the 
bankruptcy petition was recently filed but no further action was taken. Consider- 
ations against allowing conversion included whether a reorganization plan has 
been filed or confirmed, or whether the parties had substantially relied on pre- 
chapter 12 law. Id. 
301. 132 CONG.REC. H9OOl (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986). These statements ignore that se- 
cured claimants may lose in chapter 12 if the reorganization is ultimately unsuc- 
cessful and collateral values decline after plan confirmation. 
302. Id. at S15075 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986). 
303. Id. 
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speed with which chapter 12 cases would be required to proceed.304 
Senator Deconcini, while supporting chapter 12, correctly suggested 
that it could work a hardship on agricultural lenders to write off debt 
with no opportunity under the section l l l (b)  election to recover the 
deficiencies when the farm crisis ends and asset values recover. Sena- 
tor Deconcini suggested that any farmer with an undersecured loan 
would take advantage of chapter 12's debt write down provisions, re- 
gardless of his financial status.305 Senator Deconcini argued that the 
provisions favoring farm debtors would reduce the likelihood of vol- 
untary workouts in favor of chapter 12.306 The Senator suggested that 
the effects of chapter 12 be closely monitored and that any inequities 
be promptly remedied. 
The Conference Report was adopted by the House on October 2, 
1986, and the Senate the following day.307 The bill was signed by Pres- 
ident Reagan on October 27, 1986.308 
Chapter 12 allows qualifying family farmers an attractive opportu- 
nity to reorganize their finances. Insolvent debtors can reduce debt to 
the value of their nonexempt assets. High interest rates may be re- 
duced to market levels. Secured debt may be restructured over a 
longer period of time, lowering payment requirements. A chapter 12 
debtor is subject to the best interests of creditor rule, but is not subject 
to the absolute priority rule or the section llll(b)(2) election and en- 
joys more lenient adequate protection requirements. Chapter 12 is a 
short proceeding, which will shorten most farm bankruptcy proceed- 
ings. However, the short time period, which may be as short as 45 days 
for the well prepared chapter 12 debtor, give creditors little time to 
respond or marshal1 their case. This may hamper creditors in ob- 
jecting to asset valuation, reorganization plans and debt discharge, as 
~- - - - - -  
304. Id. a t  S15075-76 (Statement of Sen. Grassley). 
305. Id. at S15092. However, debt can be written down only to the extent that the 
farmer is actually insolvent. Thus a solvent farmer cannot write down debt in 
chapter 12 even though a particular loan may be undersecured. See i n .  text 
accompanying notes 479-86. 
306. 132 CONG. REC. S15092 (daily ed. Oct. 3,1986). This argument ignores the strong 
tradition of self reliance and nearly universal farmer aversion to bankruptcy. If 
anything chapter 12 has increased the possibility of debt workouts by making 
lenders more willing to accept debt write downs than they were when the 
farmer's only reorganization option was chapter 11. See infra 3 VI. 
307. 132 CONG.REC. H9002; (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986); id (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986). 
308. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986). 
309. Ftegarding chapter 12, see \Vilson, Chapter 22: Family Farm Reorganization, 8 
J.AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 299 (1987); Armstrong, The Family Farmer Bankruptcg Act 
of1986: A n  Analysis for Farm Lenders, 104 BANKING L.J. 189 (1987); J .  Anderson 
& J. Morris, supra note 6. 
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well as pursuing preferences and fraudulent conveyances. While 
chapter 12 debtors must devote all disposable income to repayment of 
objecting unsecured claim holders, creditors will be required to care- 
fully monitor the debtor's income and expenditures to insure compli- 
ance with this requirement. Most insolvent farmers will be required 
to pay unsecured claim holders little, if anything, in chapter 12, per- 
haps hampering their chances for needed post-confirmation credit. 
While the best interests of creditors test insures in theory that credi- 
tors will receive at least the liquidated value of their claim, secured 
claimants will ultimately lose if the reorganization attempt is unsuc- 
cessful and collateral values decline after confirmation. Because of 
the advantages it provides qualifying farm debtors, chapter 12 may re- 
sult in more voluntary farm debt workouts. 
A. Eligibility. 
Chapter 12 is available only to family farmers with regular annual 
income.310 Individuals, including spouses, are family farmers if they 
are engaged in a farming operation with aggregate debts of up to $1.5 
million, 80% of which arises from the farming operation, and if at least 
50% of their gross income for the prior taxable year is from farm- 
ing.311 A corporation or partnership qualifies as a family farmer if at 
least 50% of its outstanding stock or equity owned by a single family, it 
is engaged in a farming operation conducted by a family member, it 
has aggregate debts of up to $1.5 million, at least 80% of which arises 
from the farming operation, at least 80% of its assets relate to the 
farming operation, and any corporate stock is not publicly traded.312 
Corporate or partnership family farmers are not subject to the 50% 
gross farm income requirement.313 Family farmers are exempted 
310. 11 U.S.C.A. 9 109(f) (West Supp. 1987). A family farmer with regular annual in- 
come is defined as one whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable 
the family farmer to make payments under a chapter 12 plan. Id. 9 lOl(18). 
311. Id. $101(17)(A). The debt on the family farmer's principal residence is excluded 
from the 80% farm debt limitation unless such debt arises from the farming oper- 
ation. Id; In  re Henderson Ranches, 75 Bankr. 225 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987). The 
$1.5 million debt limitation is as of the date the bankruptcy petition is filed. 11 
U.S.C.A. 3 101(17)(A) (West Supp. 1987); In re Labig, 74 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1987). See also Matter of Rinker, 75 Bankr. 65 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987). 
312. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 101(17)(B) (West Supp. 1987). The debt on the family's principal 
residence is excluded from the $1.5 million limitation unless such debt arises 
from the farming operation. Id. 
313. One court has declined to address the constitutionality of not establishing a 50% 
gross income test for family farm corporations or partnerships as not constituting 
a "core" bankruptcy proceeding. I n  re Lawless, 74 Bankr. 54 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1987). Regarding core bankruptcy proceedings see 28 U.S.C. 9 157(b)(2); Marrion, 
Core Proceedings and the "New" Bankmptcy Jurisdiction, 35 DEPAUL .REv. 675 
(1987). 
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from involuntary chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy cases.314 
Because chapter 12 offers farm debtors significant advantages over 
chapter 11, litigation is likely regarding whether farm debtors in fact 
qualify for chapter 12. One issue already raised is whether a debtor is 
engaged in farming. Farming is not defined by the Code, but a farm- 
ing operation "includes farming, tillage of the soil, dairy farming, 
ranching production or raising of crops, poultry or livestock, and pro- 
duction of poultry, or livestock products in an unmanufactured 
state."315 Section 109(f) does not specify when the debtor must be 
engaged in farming in order to qualify for chapter 12. Some bank- 
ruptcy courts have held the farming requirement must be met when 
the chapter 12 petition is filed.316 This is likely to be an issue where 
the debtor either has rented out the farm, probably because of inabil- 
ity of obtain operating financing, or where the debtor is liquidating. 
Thus far the cases indicate that the farmer is not engaged in farming 
in either case.317 Given the congressional intent to help farmers stay 
on the farm, this interpretation seems appropriate.318 
A related issue is whether at least 50% of the farmer's gross income 
is farm income. Thus far bankruptcy courts are divided regarding 
whether cash rent income is farm income, although the Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Nebraska has ruled in the negative.319 In- 
come sources (other than direct farm earnings) which have qualified 
as farm income include the sale of farm equipment and land,320 cattle 
hauling for other farmers,321 and federal farm program payments.322 
An individual retirement account distribution has been determined to 
constitute non-farm income, even though the IRA was funded with 
farm earnings.323 Courts have split regarding whether income tax 
principles should govern in determining whether income is farm in- 
314. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 303(a) (West Supp. 1987). 
315. Id. 5 lOl(20). 
316. In re Labig, 74 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Tim Wargo & Songs, 
Inc., 74 Bankr. 469 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987); In re Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74 
Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987); In re Tart, 73 Bankr. 78 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1987). 
317. In re Labig, 74 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc., 
74 Bankr. 469 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987) (landlord not engaged in farming); In re 
Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987) (landlord not engaged 
in farming); In re Tart, 73 Bankr. 78, 80 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987). 
318. 132 CONG.REC. H8999 (daily ed. Oct. 2,1986). 
319. In re Haschke, 77 Bankr. 223 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987), citing Matter of Armstrong, 
812 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Mary Freese Farms, Inc., 73 Bankr. 508 
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1987); In re Welch, 74 Bankr. 401,404 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); 
Contra In re Rott, 73 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987). 
320. In re Shepherd, 75 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Rott, 73 Bankr. 366 
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); In re Armstrong, 812 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1987). 
321. In re Guinnane, 73 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987). 
322. In re Shepherd, 75 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987). 
323. In re Nelson, 73 Bankr. 363 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987). 
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come for purposes of chapter 12.324 One may expect amended tax re- 
turns and similar prefiling activity as farm debtors seek to restructure 
their income to qualify for chapter 12. Whether such activities will be 
successful remains to be seen. 
Finally, some of the early chapter 12 litigation has addressed the 
$1.5 million debt limitation. In In re  Johnson the bankruptcy court 
ruled that spouses could not simply sever joint debts to avoid the $1.5 
million debt limitation in order to qualify for separate chapter 12 
cases.325 In In re  Labig, the bankruptcy court ruled that an assignee's 
postpetition willingness to forego claims against the farm debtor 
could not be used to reduce debtor's indebtedness below the $1.5 mil- 
lion lirnit.326 Similarly, future litigation can be expected as to whether 
prepetition debt repayment to qualify for chapter 12 constitutes a pref- 
erence or bad faith filing. 
B. Conversion or Dismissal. 
Bankruptcy cases filed after November 26, 1986 may be converted 
to chapter 12.327 Whether bankruptcy cases filed before chapter 12's 
effective date may be similarly converted is unclear, and has gener- 
ated most of the early chapter 12 litigation. Section 302(c)(l) of the 
1986 bankruptcy act states that the chapter 12 amendments do not ap- 
ply to cases filed before the act's effective date of November 26,1986. 
However, the legislative history clearly indicates that the conferees 
intended bankruptcy courts to allow conversion of existing farm bank- 
ruptcy cases to chapter 12 in their equitable discretion.328 The failure 
of the statute to comport with the legislative history is doubtless a 
drafting error which will prevent many family farmers from con- 
verting their existing bankruptcy case to chapter 12. Of the reported 
cases, a majority do not allow conversion329 while a substantial minor- 
324. Court will not look behind filed income tax return regarding the 50% gross farm 
income requirement. In  re Nelson, 73 Bankr. 363, 365 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987). 
Contra, In  re Rott, 73 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (debt forgiveness income 
not included in gross income calculations even though constituted taxable 
income). 
325. 73 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987). The court also found that the petitions 
were not filed in good faith and did not allow conversion to chapter 11. 
326. 74 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987). 
327. 11 U.S.C.A. $3 706, 1112, 1307 (West Supp. 1987). To convert from chapter 11 to 
chapter 12 the conversion must be equitable. Id. 8 1112(d)(3). The motion to con- 
vert must include the debtor's proposed chapter 12 plan. Local R. Bankr. 1 2 4 2 )  
(D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986). 
328. See text accompanying note 300, supra. 
329. In re Solomon, 72 Bankr. 506 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987); In re Keinath Bros. Dairy 
Farm, 71 Bankr. 993 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); I n  re Evans, 72 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. 
D. Or. 1987); In  re Rossman, 70 Bankr. 985 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) In re Mc- 
Donald, 72 Bankr. 227 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1987); In re Ray, 70 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 1987); In  re Hughes, 70 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987); In  re Glazier, 69 
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ity do.330 The first district court opinion on the issue follows the mi- 
nority approach.331 While the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Nebraska has not directly ruled on the issue, it has allowed a chapter 
13 debtor to file a chapter 12 case and then to dismiss its chapter 13 
case.332 The interim chapter 12 rules for the District of Nebraska 
treat a motion to convert a pre-chapter 12 farm bankruptcy case to a 
new chapter 12 case as a motion to diSmiss,333 inviting the debtor to 
file a new chapter 12. 
The debtor may convert the chapter 12 case to a chapter 7 case at 
any time.334 The debtor might elect to do so if his liquidation analysis 
indicated that reorganization was not financially feasible.335 If a case 
has not already been converted from chapter 7 or 11 to chapter 12, the 
debtor may at any time request the court to dismiss the case.336 The 
court may dismiss a chapter 12 case for a variety of reasons, including 
the debtor's unreasonable delay or gross mismanagement prejudicial 
to creditors,337 failure to timely file a reorganization plan,33s failure to 
make timely payments or material default under a confirmed plan,339 
denial of confirmation and denial of the time to file an additional 
plan,340 revocation of confirmation and the debtor's failure to obtain 
Bankr. 666 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987); In re Lindsey, 69 Bankr. 632 (Bankr. C.D. 
Ill. 1987); In re Barclay, 69 Bankr. 552 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987); In re Spears, 69 
Bankr. 511 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987); In re  Litteral, 74 Bankr. 14 (Bankr. W.D. La. 
1987); In re Petty, 69 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987); In re Albertson, 68 
Bankr. 1017 (Bankr. W.D. Ma. 1987); In re Groth, 69 Bankr. 90 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1987); In re Fischer, 72 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In re  Council, 70 Bankr. 
20 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987); In re B.A.V., Inc., 68 Bankr. 411 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1986); In re TomIin Farms, Inc. 68 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986); In re Calif. 
Land & Equip. Leasing Co. Inc., 72 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Calif. 1984). 
330. In re Nelson, 73 Bankr. 363 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In re Gamble, 72 Bankr. 75 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); In re Orr, 71 Bankr. 639 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987); In re 
Anderson, 70 Bankr. 883 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987); In re Woloschaak Farms, 70 
Bankr. 498 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Mason, 70 Bankr. 753 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Henderson, 69 Bankr. 982 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987); In re Big 
Dry Angus Ranch, Inc., 69 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); In re Fischer, 72 
Bankr. 634 (Bankr- D. Kan. 1987); In re Erickson Partnership, 68 Bankr. 819 
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1987), aff'd 74 Bankr. 670 (S.D.S.D. 1987); accord J. Anderson & J. 
Morris, supra note 6, $5 3.09 a t  3-45 to - 54. 
331. In re Erickson Partnership, 74 Bankr. 670 (S.D.S.D. 1987), aff 'g 68 Bankr. 819 
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1987). 
332. In re Frederick, BK87-898 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987) Accord In re WoIoschaak 
Farms, 70 Bankr. 498 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Gamble, 72 Bankr. 75 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1987). 
333. h c a l  R. Bankr. 12-l(1) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986). 
334. 11 U.S.C.A. 9 1208(a) (West Supp. 1987). 
335. See text accompanying notes 475-84, infra. 
336. 11 U.S.C.A. 3 1208(b) (West Supp. 1987). 
337. Id. 5 l208(c)(l). 
338. Id. 5 1208(c)(3). 
339. Id. $8 l208(c)(4), 1208(c)6). 
340. Id. 5 l208(c)(5). 
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confirmation of a modified plan,34l and continuing loss or diminution 
of the estate and lack of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation.342 
The court may dismiss or convert to chapter 7 if the debtor has com- 
mitted fraud in connection with the case.343 
There is no specific provision authorizing conversion from chapter 
12 to chapter 11 or 13.344 At least one bankruptcy court has denied 
conversion from chapter 12 to chapter 11.345 
C. Case Administration. 
Case administration in chapter 12 will be an interesting mixture of 
chapters 11 and 13. The deadlines are short, similar to chapter 13, but 
opportunities for litigation (and preconfirmation negotiation and com- 
promise) abound. In most cases the short time period for filing claims, 
objections, etc. and the local rules encouraging negotiation and com- 
promise will minimize litigation. Where large amounts are at stake, 
however, and no clear precedent has been established, litigation will 
probably be undertaken. 
The major items of chapter 12 case administration include the 
chapter 12 trustee's authorities, the chapter 12 debtor's authorities, 
and adequate protection requirements. 
Filings and Notices. The chapter 12 filing fee is $200.346 Schedules 
of assets, liabilities and creditors must be filed within 15 days of filing 
or the case will be dismissed for cause.347 Within 10 days of filing the 
schedules, the debtor must serve notice of the initial meeting of the 
creditors to all parties.348 The initial notice must contain the date the 
schedules were filed, the date for the meeting of the creditors (section 
341 hearing), a statement that objections to discharge must be filed 
within 60 days of the section 341 hearing, and a statement that creditor 
claims must be filed within 30 days of the filing of the schedules.349 If 
a plan was filed with the petition, as is likely to be common practice 
unless the bankruptcy petition is an emergency filing, the notice must 
list the confirmation hearing date (not later than 45 days after filing 
the plan350) and must include a copy of the plan.351 Otherwise, the 
notice must include a statement that the debtor will serve all parties 
341. Id. $ 1208(c)(7). 
342. Id. $ 1208(c)(9). 
343. Id. $1208(d). 
344. In re Orr, 71 Bankr. 639 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987). 
345. I n  re Lawless, 74 Bankr. 54-55 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). 
346. 28 U.S.C.A. $1930(a)(5) (West Supp 1987). 
347. Local R. Bankr. 12-2(2) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986). 
348. Id. 12-2(3). The parties include all creditors, the U.S. Attorney, the chapter 12 
trustee, and any other entity requesting notice. Id. 
349. Id. 12-3(1). 
350. 11 U.S.C.A. $1224 (West Supp. 1987). 
351. Local R. Bankr. 12-3(l)(g) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986). 
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with a copy of the plan when it is filed, and provide notice of the con- 
firmation hearing date. 
Claims and Objections. Creditors's proofs of claims must be filed 
within 30 days of the order for relief if the schedules are filed with the 
petition; otherwise within 45 days of the order for relief.352 Objections 
to creditors's claims must be filed at least ten days prior to the confir- 
mation hearing. Claims not timely filed will be allowed or disallowed 
as shown on the debtor's schedules. 
C7taptm 22 Tmcstee. A trustee will be appointed in each chapter 12 
case.353 In districts, such as Nebraska, where the U.S. Trustee system 
has not yet been implemented, a standing trustee will be appointed by 
the bankruptcy court.354 The chapter 12 trustee has many but not all 
the duties of a chapter 7 or 11 trustee, including: examining and ob- 
jecting to proofs of claim, opposing discharge, furnishing information 
regarding the estate and estate administration to a party in interest, 
and investigating the debtor's financial condition and business opera- 
tion.355 Given the short duration of the chapter 12 case, between 45 
and 135 days,356 the trustee is unlikely to have time to investigate the 
debtor's farm operations except in unusual cases. The trustee must 
also appear and be heard at all valuation hearings, confirmation hear- 
ings, postconfirmation plan modification hearings, and sales of estate 
property.357 The trustee must approve section 1206 sales of farmland 
and farm equipment.358 The trustee will monitor the debtor's per- 
formance of the plan,359 and if the debtor is removed as debtor in pos- 
session, administer the property of the estate.360 However, the trustee 
is not authorized to file a reorganization plan.361 The trustee must file 
any required state or local income tax return for the estate.362 The 
trustee's will have more of an arm's length relationship with a chapter 
12 debtor than a chapter 13 debtor, similar to chapter 11. 
The chapter 12 trustee's fees can significantly affect the ultimate 
cost of a chapter 12 reorganization to debtors. For cases filed before 
November 26, 1989 or thirty days after the U.S. trustee's program is 
extended to Nebraska, the trustee is entitled to a fee of up to 10% of 
352. Id. 124. 
353. 11 U.S.C.A. $1202(a) (West Supp. 1987). 
354. A standing Chapter 12 Trustee has been appointed for the District of Nebraska. 
See Local Bankr. Rules 3 (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986). 
355. 11 U.S.C.$$704(5)-(7), 1106(a)(3) (1982); 11 U.S.C.A. 3 1202 (b)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 
1987). 
356. The plan must be filed within 90 days of the petition, while the confirmation 
hearing must be held within 45 days of the plan's filing. Id. §§ 1221, 1224. 
357. Id. § 1202@)(3). 
358. See inj?-a note 378 and accompanying text. 
359. 11 U.S.C.A. 9 1202(b)(4) (West Supp. 1987). 
360. Id. $ 5  1202(b)(5), 1203. 
361. Id. $1221. 
362. Id. 1231(b). 
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all payments made under a confirmed chapter 12 plan up to $450,000, 
and 3% of all additional payments.363 When the U.S. trustee's pro- 
gram is implemented in Nebraska, the chapter 12 trustee fee standard 
will be the same, although such fees will be established by the U.S. 
Attorney General rather than by the individual bankruptcy court.364 
Currently U.S. trustees are charging the full 10% fee.365 Some debtors 
have unsuccessfully sought to avoid paying trustee's fees by makizlg 
payments to secured creditors directly rather than through the 
trustee.366 Until the U.S. trustee's program is implemented in Ne- 
braska trustee's fees are likely to be substantially less than 10%. This 
could change when the U.S. trustee program is implemented. Impos- 
ing the maximum trustee's fee could sigdicantly raise the cost of 
chapter 12 to debtors, and reduce its attractiveness. 
C7tapter 12 Debtor. The chapter 12 debtor is a debtor in possession, 
and enjoys virtually the same powers as a chapter 11 debtor in posses- 
sion.367 The debtor may use, sell or lease property of the estate other 
than in the ordinary course of business,368 obtain operating credit,369 
reject, affirm or assign executory contracts and unexpired leases,370 
avoid judicial liens and unperfected liens,371 avoid certain statutory 
liens,372 avoid fraudulent conveyances,373 avoid preferential trans- 
fers,374 abandon property of the estate,375 operate the farm,376 and ex- 
ercise the exclusive right to file a chapter 12 reorganization plan.377 
After notice and hearing, the debtor may, with the approval of the 
trustee, sell farmland or farm equipment free of liens and without 
creditors's approval, although sale proceeds are subject to the lien.378 
363. Id. $ 1202(d)(l)(B); Pub. L. No. 94-554, $$ 302(c), 302(d)(2)(A), 302(d)(2)(B)(xi). 
364. 28 U.S.C. $ 586(e)(l)(B) (1982). 
365. See I n  re Citrowske, 72 Bankr. 613, 615 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). 
366. See I d ;  I n  re Rott, 73 B.R. 366 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); I n  re Meyer, 73 Bankr. 457 
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); I n  re Centineo, 4 Bankr. 654 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980). 
Trustee fees are based on plan payments, not farm income. I n  re Janssen 
Charlais Ranch, Inc., 73 Bankr. 125 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987). 
367. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 1203 (West Supp. 1987). The chapter 11 debtor in possession's au- 
thorities include all those of a chapter 11 trustee. 11 U.S.C. 1107(a) (1982). Those 
duties include most of the duties of a chapter 7 trustee, id .  3 1106(a)(l), in addi- 
tion to the general estate administration authorities granted a trustee under titles 
3 and 5. 
368. 11 U.S.C. 3 363(b) (Supp. I11 1985). If collateral is sold, the sale is subject to the 
creditor's approval. Id. at  8 363(f). 
369. Id. $ 364 (1982). 
370. Id. $ 365 (1982 & Supp. I11 1985). 
371. Id. $544 (1982). 
372. Id. $ 545. 
373. Id. $3 544; 548 (1982 & Supp. I11 1985). 
374. Id. $ 547 (1982). 
375. Id. $ 544. 
376. Id. $ 1203 (West Supp. 1987). 
377. Id. $1221. 
378. Id. $ 1206. This section authorizes the trustee to make such sales. As a practical 
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This new authority to sell property free of liens allows the farmer to 
downsize his operation and use the proceeds to operate, providing 
lienholders with substitute collateral on a future crop.379 
The debtor in possession may be removed for prepetition and 
postpetition fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross management.380 
In such a case the trustee may assume operation of the case, although 
the more likely result is dismissal.3sl 
Proper& of the Estate. Property of the estate includes postpetition 
property and earnings, similar to chapter 13.382 
Automatic Stay and Adequate Protection. In addition to the sec- 
tion 362 automatic stay, chapter 12 establishes a special co-debtor stay 
for persons guaranteeing consumer (but not business) debts.383 To use 
property of the estate (including cash collateral) in preconfirmation 
farming operations, the chapter 12 debtor must provide adequate pro- 
tection to secured creditors. However, section 361 and its indubitable 
equivalent standard do not apply in chapter 12 cases.384 Thus, one of 
the major obstacles to successful chapter 11 farm reorganizations has 
been removed from chapter 12.385 Adequate protection may be pro- 
vided by making cash payments or giving a replacement lien reflecting 
collateral depreciation from use,3*6 by paying customary farmland 
rental payments, based on the land's rental value, net income, and 
earning capacity,387 or by the court's p rov ihg  such other relief as will 
matter the trustee will do so only when so requested by the debtor. Thus the 
practical effect of 8 1206 is to authorize the debtor to sell farmland and equipment 
without creditors's consent if the trustee approves. 
379. This is possible because section 361 and its indubitable equivalence standard do 
not apply to chapter 12. Id. at §l205(a) See also infra text a t  notes 430-36. 
380. Id. 5 1204(a). The debtor in possession may be reinstated by the court. Id. at 
5 1204(b). 
381. Id. 5 l208(c)(l),(d). 
382. Id. § 1207(a). Cf. id. § 1306. 
383. Id. 5 1201. Cf. 11 U.S.C. $1301 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985). See I n  re Bigtalk, 75 
Bankr. 561 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); In  re Circle Five, Inc., 75 Bankr. 686 (Bankr. 
D. Idaho 1987). A chapter 12 plan proposing to release non-consumer co-debtors 
could not be confirmed over creditors's objections. In  re Robinson Ranch, Inc., 75 
Bankr. 606 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987). 
384. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1205(a) (West Supp. 1987). Chapter 12 debtor not required to pay 
postpetition interest as adequate protection to undersecured creditor. I n  r e  Ren- 
nich, 70 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1987). 
385. See supra text at notes 149-66. 
386. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1205(b)(1)(2), (West Supp. 1987). Adequate protection is not re- 
quired for real estate value declines. I n  re Raylyn AG Inc., 72 Bankr. 523 (Bankr. 
S.D. Iowa 1987). 
387. 11 U.S.C.A. 3 1205(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987). Chapter 12 debtors may argue that 
adequate protection payments are not required until the creditor could have ob- 
tained clear title to the collateral through foreclosure, adopting the approach of 
In  re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (1987). 
See supra text accompanying notes 149-66. However the AhZers court's reasoning 
was significantly based on 5 361, which does not apply to chapter 12. Thus the 
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adequately protect collateral value or an ownership interest.388 
The local bankruptcy rules for the District of Nebraska encourage 
negotiation and settlement of adequate protection disputes. Creditors 
who have farmland for collateral and request relief from the auto- 
matic stay must state whether the parties have an agreement from the 
farm debtor agreeing to pay 1205(b)(3) fair rental value, whether the 
debtor's offer is inadequate, the position of the parties relative to the 
motion, and a statement that the parties have been unable to reach an 
agreement or compromise.389 If the collateral at issue is personal 
property, the creditor's motion must specify the contacts the creditor 
made with debtor's counsel regarding adequate protection, any offer of 
adequate protection made by the debtor, the reason such offer was re- 
jected, and the creditor's demand of adequate protection with justifica- 
tion.390 In either case no relief from the stay shall be granted if the 
creditor has failed to attempt to resolve the matter with debtor's coun- 
sel prior to the hearing.391 
D. Chapter 12 Farm Reorganization Plan Requirements 
The chapter 12 plan is the heart of the chapter 12 reorganization. 
In the plan the insolvent debtor can write down debt to the value of 
assets (net of exemptions), discharging loan deficiencies. Debt repay- 
ment can be extended, and high interest rates can be reduced to cur- 
rent market levels. After acquired property clauses generally are cut 
off in bankruptcy, giving the farm debtor an opportunity to use future 
crops to finance current operations or repay other creditors. Default 
can be cured and foreclosures avoided. For many farmers the reduced 
debt may make the operation financially viable. 
The purpose of chapter 12, like chapter 13, is confirmation of a re- 
organization plan. Creditors do not vote on a plan, and a reorganiza- 
tion plan can be crammed down dissenting creditors. The l l l l (b)  
election is not available, nor is the absolute priority rule, making a 
confirmable farm reorganization plan the rule rather than the 
exception. 
Despite the many advantages provided debtors in chapter 12, credi- 
tors are still able to object to asset valuation, interest rates, repayment 
terms, and plan feasibility. Thus, preconfirmation negotiation and liti- 
gation will be the norm. The short time available to creditors to op- 
pose a plan, however, means that strategies that are successful in 
Ahlers' rationale regarding when adequate protection payments are required may 
not apply in chapter 12. 
388. 11 U.S.C.A. $1205(b)(4) (West Supp. 1987). 
389. Local R. Bankr. 12-7(1) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986). 
390. Id. at  12-7(2). 
391. Id. at 12-7(3). The motion will be heard on the affidavits and argument of counsel 
only. Id. 
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chapter I1 will not necessarily succeed in chapter 12. This section will 
examine the formal requirements, including confirmation require- 
ments, for a chapter 12 plan. The next section will analyze the consid- 
erations for formulating an acceptable chapter 12 plan which meets 
these requirements. 
Plan Filing. The debtor has the exclusive right to file a chapter 12 
plan; neither creditors nor the trustee can do 50.392 The plan must be 
filed within 90 days of the petition unless time is extended by the 
court.393 Most plans will be filed with the petition to shorten the pe- 
riod of the bankruptcy proceeding. Failure to file a timely plan is 
grounds for dismissal.394 
Plan Contents. The chapter 12 plan has mandatory and discretion- 
ary components, and is modeled after the chapter 13 plan content re- 
quirements.395 The plan must provide for the submission of all or as 
much of debtor's future earnings and income to the trustee as is 
needed to implement the plan.396 All priority claims must be paid in 
full either in cash or in deferred payments unless the holder agrees to 
a different treatment.397 If the plan classifies claims each claim in a 
particular class must be the same unless a claim holder agrees to less 
favorable treatment.398 In addition to these mandatory provisions, the 
plan may contain other discretionary provisions which provide the 
real reorganization opportunities. The plan may modify the rights of 
secured and unsecured claims, which provides the opportunity to re- 
duce loan balances due, as well as to modify loan terms, substitute col- 
lateral, etc.399 The plan may provide for the curing or waiving of any 
392. 11 U.S.C.A. $1221 (West Supp. 1987). 
393. Filing plan one day late excused by court where there was no intent by the debtor 
to delay the proceedings. In re Raylyn AG, Inc., 72 Bankr. 523 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 
1987). 
394. 11 U.S.C.A. $1208(c)(3) (West Supp. 1987); In re Lawless, 74 Bankr. 54 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1987). 
395. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1222 (West Supp. 1987). Cf. id. at 5 1322. 
396. Id. $ 1222(a)(l). 
397. Id. 5 1222(a)(2). See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. Administrative ex- 
penses may be paid on deferred basis, in contrast to chapter 11, where administra- 
tive expenses must be paid in full on the effect date of the plan. In re Citrowske, 
72 Bankr. 613,617 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). 
398. 11 U.S.C.A. $1222(a)(3) (West Supp. 1987) A bankruptcy court had occasion to 
discuss the nature of claim classification in a chapter 12 case that apparently was 
debtor counsel's first bankruptcy case. The court stated that (1) claims in the 
same class should be substantially similar, (2) secured claims are almost never 
substantiaIIy similar and should be in separate classes, (3) secured and unsecured 
claims should be segregated into separate classes, even if the creditor is the same, 
and (4) unsecured creditors have special objection rights, and segregation of a 
claim into secured and unsecured components is not a mere formality. In re Ci- 
trowske, 72 Bankr. 613, 616 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). 
399. 11 U.S.C.A. 51222(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987). In In re O'Farrell, 74 Bankr. 421 
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) the court approved a plan with a mortgage with the re- 
payment term rewritten to 30 years. 
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prepetition default,400 including default on long term debt exceeding 
the term of the plan,401 giving the debtor the opportunity to decelerate 
any accelerated loans. Unsecured claims may be paid concurrently 
with secured claims, allowing unsecured claimants to receive some 
payment before secured claimants have been paid in ful1.402 The plan 
may provide for the assumption, rejection, or assignment of any exec- 
utory contract or unexpired lease.403 This is in addition to the section 
1203 authority to do so as a debtor in possession. The plan may pro- 
vide for payment of all or part of a claim with property of the estate, 
including exempt property.404 The plan may provide for the sale of 
property of the estate or the distribution of property of the estate,405 
which would allow downsizing the farming operation as part of the 
plan, Secured claims may be paid over a longer period than the period 
of the plan.406 This allows debtors to reamortize secured long and me- 
dium term debt over longer periods, reducing payment requirements. 
The plan may provide for vesting of the property of the estate in the 
debtor or other entity at confirmation or at a later time (e.g. regarding 
long term debt).407 Finally, any other provision not inconsistent with 
the Code may be included in a reorganization plan, giving full rein to 
the ingenuity of counsel in developing creative financing alternatives 
and compromises.4o8 The latter provision might allow, e.g. payment 
of interest only for a term and then payment of interest and principle 
when priority claims have been satisfied; or repayment over a thirty 
year reamortization schedule with a five year balloon payment. The 
plan cannot exceed three years (except for payments on long term se- 
cured debt), although the court may approve a plan of up to five 
years.409 
Plan Confirmation Criteria. The plan must comply with all provi- 
sions of chapter 12 and all applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code.410 This includes the section 1222(a) mandatory plan content 
400. 11 U.S.C.A. 8 1222(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987). 
401. Id. $1222(b)(5). Default may be cured within a reasonable time under the plan. 
Id. 
402. Id. 3 1222(b)(4); 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY fi 1222.03 at  1222-4 (15th 
Ed. 1987). 
403. 11 U.S.C.A. 8 1222(b)(6) (West Supp. 1987). 
404. Id. 1222(b)(7). In I n  re  Massengill, 73 Bankr. 1008, 1013 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987) 
the court approved debtor's returning Production Credit Association stock and 
Federal Land Bank stock to the PCA and Land Bank, respectively, over their 
objection in partial payment at  face value. 
405. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1222(b)(8) (West Supp. 1987). 
406. Id. $1222(b)(9). 
407. Id. $ 1222(b)(10). 
408. id. 1222(b)(11). 
409. Id. 5 1222(c). No separate motion is needed to have a five year term approved; it 
is merely part of confirmation process. In re Citrowske, 72 Bankr. 613, 617 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). 
410. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1225(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987). 
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requirements. The debtor must have paid the chapter 12 filing fee 
plus any amounts required in the plan to have been paid prior to con- 
firmation.411 The plan must have been proposed in good faith, an is- 
sue that is likely to result in substantial chapter 12 litigation.412 In an 
early chapter 12 case the bankruptcy court ruled that there is no good 
faith requirement that nondischargeable debts be treated differently 
under the plan. Instead, if the creditor is successful in objecting to 
discharge, the debt is not discharged as per section 1228(a).413 In the 
first chapter 12 bankruptcy court decision in the District of Nebraska 
on good faith, the court ruled that income from a $138,000 exempt an- 
nuity must be devoted to the chapter 12 plan to meet the section 
1225(a)(4) good faith requirernent.414 Zero payment plans, i.e. plans 
proposing to make no payment to unsecured creditors are likely to be 
found not in bad faith, so long as the debtor proposes to distribute all 
disposable income (if any) to unsecured claimants for the term of the 
plan.415 
The plan must propose to distribute to unsecured claimants at least 
the liquidated value of their claim as of the date of confirmation, i.e., 
at least the amount unsecured claimants would have received in chap- 
ter 7 liquidation.416 This familiar best interests of creditors test is a 
common feature of reorganization bankruptcy, and is the reason that a 
liquidation analysis is a common feature of chapter 12 bankruptcy 
planning.417 The debtor has three options regarding treatment of se- 
cured claims under the chapter 12 plan. First, the secured holder may 
accept the plan, i.e., accept its treatment under the plan.418 Alterna- 
tively, the debtor may turn the collateral over to the secured claim 
holder.419 The cramdown alternative is that the dissenting secured 
claim holder retains its lien, and the value of the property to be dis- 
411. Id. a t  9 1225(a)(2); 28 U.S.C.A. $1930(a)(5) (West Supp. 1987) See 5 W. COLLIER, 
COLLIER ON B A N K R U ~ C Y  1 1225.02, at  1225-3 (15th ed. 1987). 
412. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1225(a)(3) (West Supp. 1987). Regarding good faith litigation in 
chapters 11 and 13, see 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 111129.02[3], 
1325.04 (15th ed. 1987). 
413. In re Citrowske, 72 Bankr. 613,617 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). The court noted that 
the automatic stay preludes creditors from pursuing a non,dischargeable claim. 
However, once the plan has been completed and a discharge entered, the auto- 
matic stay is terminated and the creditor may then legally pursue its nondis- 
chargeable claim. Id. at 618. 
414. In re McKeag, 77 Bankr. 716 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). Now annuity exemptions are 
limited to $10,000. NEB.REV.STAT. 5 44-371(2) (Supp. 1987). 
415. This approach has been followed in chapter 13 cases. A chapter 13 plan to pay 
only 18% of disposable income to creditors was not proposed in good faith. In re 
Faust, 12 Bankr. 679,681 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981). Cf. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1225(b)(l)(B) 
(West Supp. 1987). 
416. Id. 5 1225(a)(4) (West Supp. 1987). 
417. Cf. id. at 6s 1124(3)(A), 1325(a)(4), 1325(a)(5)(B). 
418. Id. 5 1225(a)(5)(A). 
419. Id. $ 1225(a)(5)(C). 
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tributed to the secured claim holder (including deferred payments) is 
the allowed amount of the claim.420 This is likely to be the most fre- 
quently litigated issue in chapter 12 cases, and deserves additional dis- 
cussion. The major issues include realty collateral valuation, adequate 
protection of personalty collateral, and the appropriate interest rate. 
The issue with the greatest potential for disagreement and litiga- 
tion is farmland valuation under the plan. Farmland is likely to con- 
stitute the majority of the farmer's assets and loan collateralP2l The 
higher the valuation, the greater portion of an undersecured lender's 
claim will be secured and the smaller proportion unsecured.422 The 
higher the valuation the higher the debt repayment requirements in 
the typical chapter 12 case, and the reduced likelihood that the plan 
will be financially feasible. Debtors then will prefer lower valuations 
while secured creditors will prefer higher valuations. The official val- 
uation date is the effective date of the plan,423 although most valua- 
tions will be conducted prior to that time. In the first reported 
chapter 12 case considering the problems of valuing farm real estate 
relative to plan confirmation, the bankruptcy court refused to limit 
itself to a consideration of the farmland's rental value despite Con- 
gress' use of rental value in section 1205 adequate protection determi- 
nations.424 The court also considered comparable sales and capitalized 
income. The bankmptcy court for the district of Nebraska has fol- 
lowed a capitalized earnings test rather than a comparable sales test, 
although generalizing from only one case may be inappropriate.425 
Any outstanding real estate taxes would be subtracted from the value 
of an undersecured lender's claim as a prior lien,426 as would any prop- 
erty exemption.427 
The local bankruptcy rules for the District of Nebraska will en- 
courage compromise of differences in farmland valuation. The rules 
state that objections to real estate valuation will not be sustained un- 
less the objecting party has consulted with a pro se debtor or debtor's 
counsel regarding valuation.428 The objecting party's motion must in- 
clude an affidavit stating that the parties are unable to reach a valua- 
tion compromise, provide the parties' respective good faith estimates 
420. Id. $9 1225(a)(5)(B), 1222(b)(9). 
421. See infra note 7. 
422. 11 U.S.C. 506(a) (1982). 
423. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1987) See In re Statmore, 22 Bankr. 37 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1982). Other things being equal, a court is likely to favor a later 
property valuation. 
424. In r e  Beyer, 72 Bankr. 525, 527-28 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987). 
425. In re McKeag, 77 Bankr. 716 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). 
426. In re Edwardson, 74 Bankr. 831, 835 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987). Cf. NEB.REV.STAT. 
$ 77-203 (1986). 
427. In re Brown, 22 Bankr. 363 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982). See supra text accompanying 
notes 44-54. 
428. LOCAL R. BANKR. 12-5(1) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986). 
. 
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of value, and state whether either estimates are supported by a quali- 
fied appraisal conducted uithin 90 days of filing the affidavit. The 
costs of any hearing on objections to the plan may be taxed "propor- 
tionate to the value determined at said hearing."429 This last provision 
should help keep the parties' farmland valuations more realistic. 
Where collateral is personal property rather than realty, an impor- 
tant issue is whether an after acquired property clause has been cut off 
by the bankruptcy petition. The automatic stay does not cut off an 
after acquired property clause in postpetition proceeds, offspring, 
rents or profits.430 Thus, if the collateral is farm equipment, the after 
acquired property clause in the security agreement would be cut off 
except with regards to proceeds. With regard to annual crops, the af-, 
ter acquired property clause is cut off with regard to crops planted 
after the petition was filed, but crops planted prepetition are subject to 
the security interest even if they are harvested postpetition unless the 
court orders otherwise.431 Regarding pere~lnial crops, all postpetition 
crops are subject to the prepetition security interest after acquired 
property clause,432 as are postpetition livestock offspring.433 The live- 
stock issue was considered in an early chapter 12 decision of the bank- 
ruptcy court for the District of Nebraska regarding plan confirmation. 
The debtor proposed to sell feeder pigs and cull sows in the ordinary 
course of business and sell them free of the creditor's security inter- 
est.434 The creditor objected on the basis that this would violate its 
section 552 postpetition security interest, which it is would be allowed 
to retain under section 1225(a)(5)(B)(i).435 The court analyzed these 
sections, and correctly concluded that if it prohibited livestock opera- 
tors from selling offspring it would doom any such farm reorganiza- 
tion plans. Thus, the court allowed the debtor to sell postpetition 
livestock offspring in order to fund its chapter 12 plan so long as it 
adequately protected the creditor's prepetition security interest by 
maintaining the hog herd at 110% of the remaining balance of the 
creditor's secured claim.436 As the loan balance is reduced, the size of 
herd subject to lien would be reduced accordingly. 
The final issue regarding treatment of secured claims under the 
chapter 12 plan is the appropriate interest rate for deferred payments. 
Creditors are entitled to the present value of their secured claim, 
429. Id. 12-5(5). 
430. 13. U.S.C. 552(b) (Supp. 111 1985). 
431. See Kunkel et al., supra note 39. 
432. I n  re Beck, 61 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985). 
433. In re Wobig, 73 Bankr. 292 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). 
434. Id. at 293. 
435. Id. at 293-94. 
436. Id. at 294-95. The court also required that the debtor pay any disposable income 
to unsecured claims for at  least three years, and that the unsecured portion of the 
creditor's livestock lien not be discharged for that three year period. Id. at 295-96. 
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which includes interest if the claim is not immediately paid in ful1.437 
The appropriate interest rate to apply in the chapter 12 cramdown has 
already been established by the bankruptcy court for the District of 
Nebraska. In In re  Wichmann the court ruled that the appropriate 
market interest rate is the treasury bond yield with a remaining ma- 
turity equal to the average loan amount outstanding plus a 2% risk 
factor.438 The court in Wichmann followed In re Doud,439 the first 
reported chapter 12 decision dealing with the appropriate chapter 12 
interest rate in some detail. The Doud court noted the different ap- 
proaches followed in determining the appropriate interest rate, and 
stated that the Eight Circuit has adopted a market interest rate stan- 
dard.440 In implementing this market interest rate approach, the 
Doud court used treasury bonds as the appropriate measure of an in- 
terest rate free of risk.441 The court selected treasury bonds over 
treasury bills used by other courts because treasury bond terms can be 
matched to chapter 12 repayment terms, whereas treasury bills have a 
52 week term. Selecting the appropriate term for a treasury bond re- 
quires some special calculations. Interest on treasury bills is not paid 
until the end of the treasury bond term, whereas interest and princi- 
pal on a debt would be paid at least annually. To compensate for this 
difference the Doud court matched the average percentage outstand- 
ing during the repayment period of the chapter 12 debt with the treas- 
ury bond term.442 This may be best illustrated by an example. If the 
debt is $12,000 to be repaid in six equal annual principal payments of 
$2,000, the average balance due equals $7,000. This is the total of the 
annual loan balances ($12,000 + $10,000 + $8000 + $6000 + $4000 + 
$2000 = $42,000) divided by the loan term of six years ($42,000/6 = 
$7000). The average balance due divided by the total balance due is 
$7000/12,000 or 58.33%. Thus, the treasury bond term will be 58.33% 
of the bankruptcy debt six year repayment period or three and one 
437. 11 U.S.C.A. 9 1225(a)(5)((B)(ii) (West Supp. 1987). See 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY 9 1129.03, at 1129-62 (15th ed. 1986); Carbiener, Present Value in 
Bankruptcy: The Search For A n  Apjwopriate Cramdown Discount Rate, 32 
S.D.L. REV. 42, 59-60 (1987). 
438. I n  re Wichmann, 77 Bankr. 718 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). 
439. In re, Doud, 74 Bankr. 865 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987). 
440. Id. at 867, citing I n  re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985); and United 
States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1986). 
441. I n  re Doud, 74 Bankr. 865, 868 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987). 
442. Id. citing Carbiener, supra note 437, at 64. Carbiener gives a more precise defini- 
tion: "the rate paid to the bankruptcy creditor should be based on a government 
security with a duration equal to the same percentage of the repayment period as 
the average percentage of the claim outstanding. For example, if the average 
percentage of the creditor's claim outstanding during the repayment period is 
sixty percent, and the repayment period is ten years, the discount rate should be 
based on a government security with a duration of sixty percent of ten years, or 
six years." Carbiener, supra note 437, a t  65. 
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half years.443 The Doud court added a two percent risk factor to this 
basic treasury bond rate to account for reorganization risks and the 
inherent risks in farming.444 The Doud court did not discuss on what 
date the bond rate should be established. The bankruptcy court for 
the District of Nebraska adopted the Doud analysis in Wichmann, in- 
cluding the two percent risk premium.445 The court stated that it 
would consider evidence regarding special circumstances rendering its 
discount rate calculations inapplicable, but indicated generally that it 
would follow the Doud approach.446 The Wichmann court also did 
not discuss what date would be used to establish the treasury bond 
rate. 
The final general confirmation standard for a chapter 12 reorgani- 
zation plan is a plan feasibility test, which is also likely to give rise to 
significant litigation.447 Under the test, creditors will be able to chal- 
lenge the financial viability of the farming operation, including the 
farmer's past production record and whether the farmer's income will 
fall due to scheduled farm program payment reductions.448 Interest- 
ingly, the local bankruptcy rules for the District of Nebraska require 
the farmer only to submit a one year cash flow plan.449 Creditors may 
argue that a one year cash flow projection is inadequate where a 
farmer is proposing a three to five year plan. The justification for a 
one year cash flow is that annual changes in government farm pro- 
grams, in addition to normal crop and livestock market fluctuations, 
make precise prediction of future farm prices difficult. The counter 
argument is, at least for cash grain farmers heavily dependent on farm 
program payments, that a one year cash flow projection probably over- 
states future farm income in light of scheduled reductions of farm pro- 
gram payments. 
The last special confirmation standard likely to be invoked in most 
chapter 12 cases is the unsecured claim holder cramdown standard. If 
either the trustee or an unsecured claim holder objects to confirma- 
tion, the plan must propose either to pay all unsecured claims in full, 
or else to devote all disposable income to payment of unsecured claims 
during the life of the plan for a minimum of three years.450 Disposa- 
443. Cf, In re Doud, 74 Bankr. 865, 868 nn. 1-2 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987). Generally 
treasury bond interest rates increase with the bond term. 
444. Id. at 869. Carbiener recommended a one percent risk factor. Carbiener, supra 
note 437, at  65. However, the additional risk attendant in chapter 12 farm reorga- 
nizations not present in the typical chapter 11 and 13 non-farm reorganizations 
would seem to justify the additional risk premium. 
445. In re Wichmann, 77 Bankr. 718 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). 
446. Id. at 722. 
447. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1225(a)(6) (West Supp. 1987). See In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336 
(8th Cir. 1985). 
448. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
449. LOCAL R. BANKR. 126(l)(b) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986). 
450. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1225@)(1) (West Supp. 1987). Although the statute does not so 
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ble income is income received by the debtor less reasonably necessary 
family support and reasonably necessary expenses to continue, pre- 
serve and operate the debtor's business.451 As most chapter 12 debtors 
are likely to be insolvent, and as unsecured claim holders are likely to 
object to plan confirmation, a standard feature of the typical chapter 
12 plan will be to pay all disposable income to unsecured claim holders 
for three years or any longer plan term.452 
The local bankruptcy rules for the District of Nebraska suggest 
some further chapter 12 plan confirmation requirements. The plan 
must include (1) a summary of the debtor's assets and liabilities; (2) a 
one year cash flow projection including all income sources and the as- 
sumptions upon which the income projection is based; (3) the histori- 
cal or other data justifying the cash flow assumptions (i.e. prior farm 
production and marketing records); (4) farm income and expense in- 
formation for the last four years;453 (5) projected administrative ex- 
penses, including attorney fees; (6) schedules showing the dates and 
amounts of payments to be made, including those outside the plan; (7) 
the tax consequences of any sale of assets;454 (8) the basis for property 
valuations, including a statement of whether the debtor's valuation 
varies from the creditor's valuation; (9) a justification for any payment 
of secured debts over a term exceeding three years; and (10) an 
itemization, valuation, and basis therefor of any encumbered property 
proposed to be retained by the debtor.455 
The debtor may modify the plan prior to confirmation.456 This 
would allow the debtor, inter alia, to modify the plan to reflect negoti- 
ations with creditors. If the plan is confirmed by the bankruptcy 
court, it is binding on the debtor and all creditors, even if the creditor 
is not provided for in the plan, or has rejected the plan.457 If the plan 
is not confirmed, at least one court has ruled that the debtor may file 
a new plan.458 Confirmation may be revoked for fraud if a creditor 
objects within 180 days of confirmation.459 All property of the estate 
state, the clear intent is that disposable income be paid to unsecured claim hold- 
ers. In re Citrowske, 72 Bankr. 613, 616 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). 
451. 11 U.S.C.A. $1225(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987). 
452. See In re Wobig, 73 Bankr. 292,295-96 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). 
453. The rules suggest that the information could be taken from the schedule F from 
the farmer's last four federal income tax returns. LOCAL R. BANKR. 12-6(l)(d) 
(D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986). 
454. Taxes from the sale of appreciated assets must be paid by the debtor, whereas 
income resulting from debt discharge is not taxable. See supra text accompany- 
ing notes 91-95. 
455. LOCAL R. BANKR. 12-6(1) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986). 
456. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1223 (West Supp. 1987). 
457. Id. 8 1227(a). 
458. In re Bentson, 74 Bankr. 56, 58 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). 
459. 11 U.S.C.A. 5 1230(a) (West Supp. 1987). The court may dismiss the case pursuant 
to section 1208 (erroneously referred to in section 1230(b) as section 1207) unless 
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vests in the debtor upon confirmation except as otherwise provided in 
the plan or confirmation order.460 The property vests free of credi- 
tor's claims except for debts not discharged, or as otherwise provided 
in the plan or confirmation order.461 The chapter 12 discharge is re- 
ceived when all payments under the plan are completed, except for 
payments exceeding the term of the plan.462 Debts not discharged in- 
clude those for which no proof of claim was filed,463 long term debts 
being repaid over a period longer than the period of the plan,464 and 
debts defined by the Code as nondischargeable.465 A hardship dis- 
charge may be granted by the court if the debtor is unable to make 
plan payments and if such failure is beyond the debtor's control, credi- 
tors have received at least the liquidation value of their claim, and 
postconfirmation plan modification is not practicable.466 A creditor 
may object to discharge on the basis of the debtor's fraud if the credi- 
tor did not know of such fraud until after discharge was granted.467 
An additional confirmation issue that may result in litigation is 
postconfirmation modification of the chapter 12 plan. After confirma- 
tion but before payments have been completed, the plan may be modi- 
fied to increase or decrease payments on claims of a particular class, 
extend or reduce the time of such payments (subject to the five year 
plan term limitation), or alter the distribution to a particular creditor 
based on payments made outside the plan if such modification is re- 
quested by the debtor, trustee, or unsecured claim holder.468 Ander- 
son and Morris suggest several circumstances that might lead to 
postconfirmation plan modification.469 If the debtor's income is less 
than expected, the debtor could petition the court to reduce payments 
to unsecured claim holders. If the debtor's income increased or the 
debtor obtained additional assets, unsecured claim holders could peti- 
tion the court for increased payments during the life of the plan. If 
the debtor were unable to make payments on secured claims, the 
debtor could petition the court to modify the plan or surrender the 
the debtor proposes to modify the plan and the modified plan is confirmed. Id. 
0 1230(b). 
460. Id. $ 1227(b). 
461. Id. $ 1227(c). 
462. Id. $ 1228(a). 
463. Id. $5 1228(a)(1); 523(a)(3). 
464. Id. $8 1228(a)(l), 1222(b)(5), (10) (West Supp. 1987). 
465. Id. 5 1228(a)(2); 11 U.S.C. 5 523(a) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985). Regarding nondis- 
chargeable debts, see supra text accompanying notes 83-90. 
466. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 1228(b) (West Supp. 1987). 
467. Id. $1228(d). 
468. Id. $ 1229(-a),(c). Payments outside the plan could include payments by third par- 
ties (e.g., relatives or guarantors). J. ANDERSON & J. MORRIS, supra note 6, $ 9.03, 
a t  9-11. 
469. J. ANDERSON & J. MORRIS, supra note 6, $ 9.03, at 9-11 to 9-13. 
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collateral to the secured claim holder.470 The modified plan may dis- 
tribute to unsecured claim holders less than the liquidated value of 
their claim.471 Anderson and Morris take a contrary position, arguing 
that unsecured holders must receive the liquidated value of their 
claims, citing the section 1228(b) hardship discharge requirements.472 
However, the postconfirmation plan modification confirmation re- 
quirements omit the section 1225(b) unsecured holder cramdown cri- 
terion. This suggests that a section 1228(a) regular discharge could be 
obtained under the modified plan without obtaining a section 1225(b) 
hardship discharge. The postconfirmation plan modification becomes 
the plan unless disapproved by the court.473 Thus, the modified plan 
would be the plan under which the debtor would be required to make 
all plan payments to receive a section 1225(a) discharge. 
One issue which individuals who are counselling debtors consider- 
ing chapter 12 should be aware of is the effect of an unsuccessful chap- 
ter 12 on subsequent bankruptcies, particularly a subsequent chapter 
7. An earlier chapter 12 discharge does not bar a subsequent chapter 7 
discharge within six years of the commencement of the chapter 12 
case, if the debtor paid 100% of the unsecured claims; or if the debtor 
paid 70% of the unsecured claims, the plan was proposed in good faith, 
and was the debtor's best effort.474 This provision has different effects 
depending on whether the plan failed, or whether the debtor is unable 
to pay long term secured debts after the plan has been completed and 
discharge has been granted. If the plan fails before it has been com- 
pleted, generally the debtor will have received no debt discharge (un- 
less debts were discharged in the plan). If there was no debt discharge 
there is no bar to a chapter 7 discharge. If, however, the plan has been 
completed and discharge has occurred, the debtor could qualify for a 
subsequent chapter 7 discharge only if the debtor has paid all un- 
secured claims or met the section 727(a)(9) best efforts discharge test. 
In most cases the chapter 12 discharge would have discharged much if 
not all of the debt exceeding current asset values. Thus, the inability 
of the unsuccessful chapter 12 debtor to repay long term debt would 
probably not result in the high income taxes that would have occurred 
in the absence of a bankruptcy liquidation or debt discharge. If the 
debtor cannot meet one of the hardship discharge requirements, the 
debtor will be denied a chapter 7 discharge for six years after the 
chapter 12 petition was filed. The undischarged debts remaining at 
- - -- - 
470. Note, however, that secured claimants may not petition the court for postcon- 
firmation plan modification. An interesting, and ta this point unanswered, ques- 
tion is whether a undersecured creditor may petition the court as an unsecured 
holder for modification of the plan's treatment of its secured claim. 
471. 11 U.S.C.A. $1229(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987). Cf. id. at § 1225(b). 
472. J. ANDEMON & J. MORRIS, supra note 6, $ 9.03, at 9-12 to 9-13. 
473. 11 U.S.C.A. $ 1229(b) (West Supp. 1987). 
474. 11 U.S.C. fj 727(a)(9)(1982). 
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this point, aside from nondischargeable debts, would be the long-term 
secured debts (but not the loan deficiencies). As these debts are likely 
to constitute most of the chapter 12 debtor's remaining debts, those 
debts would not be discharged in a subsequent chapter 11. Assuming 
the unsecured loan deficiencies have been discharged, little debt for- 
giveness income would be realized in a subsequent non-bankruptcy 
liquidation. Thus, most chapter 12 debtors will not be significantly pe- 
nalized if they fail to qualify for a subsequent chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
absent special considerations. 
E. Chapter 12 Plan Preparation 
This section deals with the two most important elements of the 
chapter 12 plan: debt writedown and postpetition financing.475 After 
the assets and liabilities have been scheduled, the most important part 
of the plan will be a liquidation analysis, i.e. an analysis of the value of 
each claim as if the farmer were liquidated in chapter 7 rather than 
reorganized in chapter 12. The initial liquidation analysis will indicate 
whether reorganization is feasible or not. In simple terms, insolvent 
debtors will be able to write debt down to the value of their assets, less 
any exemptions. If the debtor needs further debt writedown to make 
his reorganization feasible, he probably will not be able to have his 
plan confirmed. From the creditor's perspective, the liquidation anal- 
ysis depends on whether the creditor is oversecured, undersecured, 
priority, or unsecured. 
S e a r e d  claims. If the creditor is oversecured it will receive full 
payment under the chapter 12 plan. It will also receive interest at the 
contract rate up to the date of confirmation, and at the market rate 
approved in the plan thereafter.476 The loan term may be extended 
under the plan to help the debtor's cash flow position, although any 
disposable income will in virtually every case be paid to unsecured 
claim holders. The equity cushion in collateral pledged to an over- 
secured creditor is the value that will be applied against unsecured 
claims, as discussed below. If the creditor is undersecured, it will have 
two claims, secured and unsecured. Property valuation will be critical 
as it will determine how much of the creditor's claim is secured and 
how much is unsecured.477 Secured claims must be paid in full 
whereas in many cases unsecured claims will receive little or no pay- 
ment. Normally each secured creditor, whether oversecured or un- 
dersecured, will be placed in a separate class in the plan. 
475. For a sample chapter 12 plan, see J. ANDERSON & 3. MORRIS, supra note 6, at F-94 
-153. 
476. In re Lenz, 74 Bankr. 413 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987). 
477. Property is valued for purposes of $1225(a)(5)(B) plan confirmation as of the 
effective date of the plan. In re Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74 Bankr. 280,289 (Bankr. 
D. Or. 1987), 
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Unsecured claims. The plan must deal with all unsecured claims, 
including those of unsecured creditors and the deficiency claims of se- 
cured creditors. The debtor can place consumer claims into a separate 
category and propose a different treatment of those clairns.478 A more 
significant issue is whether the debtor's plan can discriminate in favor 
of creditors essential to the debtor's future operations. In I n  re Wobig 
the bankruptcy court for the District of Nebraska approved the spe- 
cial treatment of "necessary creditors" without discussion, suggesting 
that the court is at least receptive to this approach.479 The limits to 
which chapter 12 debtors may go in proposing special treatment for 
necessary creditors has not yet been established. 
The minimum required payment to unsecured claim holders is the 
liquidated value of their claim. There are two possible sources of 
value in the farm assets that must be paid out to unsecured claim hold- 
ers: unencumbered nonexempt assets and any equity in encumbered 
nonexempt assets.480 Unsecured claim holders then have an interest 
in asset valuation similar to that of secured claim holders: the higher 
the asset valuation, the higher the liquidation value of unsecured 
claims is likely to be. If the chapter 12 debtor is insolvent, has no 
unencumbered nonexempt property, and has no equity in encumbered 
property, the liquidated value of unsecured claims will be zero. Many, 
if not most, chapter 12 plans will be "zero plans" in that unsecured 
claims will have no liquidation value and the plan will propose no 
payment to unsecured claim holders. In such a case the court is likely 
to require that all disposable income be paid against unsecured claims 
for three years, assuming that either the trustee or an unsecured cred- 
itor objects to confirmation. Chapter 12 plans may propose to pay the 
three year's disposable income to unsecured claim holders even if the 
claims have no liquidated value to speed confirmation. In this regard 
an issue likely to be litigated is how disposable income is calculated. 
In an early chapter 12 case one court has ruled that the inclusion of a 
"reserve account" in the farm budget (probably similar to a deprecia- 
tion expense) was a reasonable business expense and did not violate 
the section 1225(b) (2) (B) disposable income requirement.481 In that 
case unsecured creditors were paid in full; a different result might 
have obtained if the plan had been a zero plan. 
Operating financing. An important component of the reorganiza- 
tion plan is operating financing. In most cases unsold crops or live- 
stock and government farm program payments will constitute the 
478. 11 U.S.C. 5 1222(b)(l). 
479. 73 Bankr. 292, 293 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). 
480. Recall that oversecured creditors are entitled to postpetition interest up to confir- 
mation. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. Thus any equity in encumbered 
assets must be in excess of these required interest payments. 
481. In re Janssen Charolais Ranch, Inc., 73 Bankr. 125, 128 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987). 
1 
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bulk of the debtor's cash collateral. Typically, the debtor will propose 
to use cash collateral as operating capital and offer replacement liens 
in future crops, program payments, etc.482 A major issue will be the 
validity of prepetition after acquired property clauses. Crops planted 
postpetition are clearly not subject to prepetition after acquired prop- 
erty clauses, and a debtor will be free to pledge those postpetition 
crops as substitute collateral for secured debt where the collateral is 
proposed to be sold to provide operating financing, or to provide collat- 
eral for postpetition operating financing. For example, if the PCA has 
a lien on the crop which has been harvested and stored, the debtor can 
propose to sell that stored crop, use the proceeds for the next season's 
operating financing, and give the PCA a lien on the future crop. Be- 
cause of the uncertainty regarding a future crop, bankruptcy courts 
are likely to require crop insurance as a condition of approving such 
collateral substitutions.483 As the secured loan is paid down, the por- 
tion of future crops that is continued to be repledged as substitute col- 
lateral will decrease over time.484 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 12 has revolutionized farm bankruptcies and indirectly 
farm credit workout negotiations. Prior to chapter 12, chapter 11 reor- 
ganization was not a realistic option for farmers. Whether the Ahlers 
decision will change this as a practical matter remains to be seen. Un- 
less the farmer could qualify for chapter 13, he had little realistic like- 
lihood of a successful bankruptcy reorganization. This gave lenders 
little legal incentive to negotiate farm debt workouts. The farmer's 
main negotiating point was the real estate mortgage foreclosure delays 
and delays associated with a bankruptcy filing. However, lenders 
would face the possibilities of these same delays if the workout failed, 
so the threat was not that effective. 
Chapter 12 has changed this by giving farmers a realistic bank- 
ruptcy reorganization option. Most insolvent farmers will be able to 
have a chapter 12 plan confirmed by writing debt down to asset values, 
unless the farmer has a poor production history. This may make lend- 
ers more willing to negotiate workouts, including accepting debt 
writedowns, to avoid having to participate in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Most financially troubled farmers would probably be willing to accept 
workout terms less generous than they could obtain in chapter 12 sim- 
ply to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy. However, some lenders may be 
unwilling to negotiate workouts outside of chapter 12 because they 
482. See, e.g., In re Beyer, 72 B.R. 523 (Bankr. S.D. Colo. 1987). 
483. See supra text accompanying notes 172177. 
484. For a similar analysis of encumbered livestock, see supra text accompanying 
notes 434-36. 
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perceive it as being inequitable regarding their other farm borrowers. 
If a lender's farm borrowers who are current on their loans learn of 
favorable treatment given to a delinquent farmer to avoid bank- 
ruptcy, the current customer may expect similar treatment and re- 
quest debt writedown and reduced interest rates. The lender can save 
face by in effect agreeing to a workout in chapter 12 rather than 
outside of bankruptcy. Using this stategy, the lender will have had no 
"choice" in the matter and will have no public relations problem with 
other farm borrowers. 
Will farmers in fact be able to successfully reorganize in chapter 
12? The answer depends not only on how chapter 12 is interpreted 
but perhaps more significantly on the weather, crop prices, the federal 
farm program, and the chapter 12 debtor's management ability. The 
prospect of reduced federal farm payments and the possibility of lower 
crop prices resulting from biotechnological changes in agriculture do 
not bode well for the highly leveraged farmer. However, chapter 12 
will give insolvent farmers an opportunity to reduce their debt load 
down to asset values. If these farmers can generate sufficient farm 
income to service these reduced debts, many will have an opportunity 
to survive in what promises to be a continually changing agricultural 
economy. 
